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Abstract
Classical approaches to experimental design assume that intervening on one unit
does not affect other units. There are many important settings, however, where this
non-interference assumption does not hold, e.g., when running experiments on supply-
side incentives on a ride-sharing platform or subsidies in an energy marketplace. In
this paper, we introduce a new approach to experimental design in large-scale stochas-
tic systems with considerable cross-unit interference, under an assumption that the
interference is structured enough that it can be captured using mean-field asymptotics.
Our approach enables us to accurately estimate the effect of small changes to system
parameters by combining unobstrusive randomization with light-weight modeling, all
while remaining in equilibrium. We can then use these estimates to optimize the system
by gradient descent. Concretely, we focus on the problem of a platform that seeks to
optimize supply-side payments p in a centralized marketplace where different suppliers
interact via their effects on the overall supply-demand equilibrium, and show that our
approach enables the platform to optimize p based on perturbations whose magnitude
can get vanishingly small in large systems.
Keywords: experimental design, interference, mean-field model, stochastic system.
1 Introduction
Randomized controlled trials are widely used to guide decision making across different do-
mains, ranging from classical industrial and agricultural applications [Fisher, 1935] to de-
velopmental economics [Banerjee and Duflo, 2011] and the modern technology sector [Athey
and Luca, 2019, Kohavi et al., 2009, Tang et al., 2010]. In its most basic form, a random-
ized trial aims to assess the expected effectiveness of a set of interventions on a population
by selecting a small but representative sub-population of units and assigning to each unit
a randomly chosen intervention. For example, in a medical trial, the decision maker may
want to compare the effectiveness of a new experimental drug with the current standard of
care. To do so they select a set of patients, and randomly assign some fraction to the new
treatment while others are given the control condition (i.e., current standard of care). The
drug is then assessed by comparing outcomes of treated and control patients. Similar ran-
domized experiments are popular with technology companies, where they are often referred
This work was partially supported by a seed grant from the Stanford Global Climate and Energy Project
and a Facebook Faculty Award.
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to as A/B tests. In this context, a company would select a small population of its users and
expose them to different randomly generated designs; the best design that emerges from the
experiment is then deployed to the entire user base at large.
When interpreting the results from randomized trials, it is common to make a “no inter-
ference” assumption, whereby we assume that the intervention assigned to any given unit
does not affect observed outcomes for other units [Imbens and Rubin, 2015]; for example,
in our medical example, we might assume that giving the experimental treatment to some
patients does not affect outcomes for the control patients who are still receiving standard
care. Such lack of interference plays a key role in enabling us to use randomized trials to
understand the effect of large scale policy interventions, as it implies that any effects ob-
served by experimenting on a representative sub-population should also hold when the same
interventions are applied to the overall population at large.
Unfortunately, the non-interference assumption is violated in many important appli-
cations. For example, Blake and Coey [2014] document failures of the non-interference
assumption due to an interaction between treated and control customers in an experiment
run by an online marketplace. Heckman et al. [1998] discuss the role of equilibrium effects
in understanding the effect of changes in tuition rates on college enrollment, and argue that
traditional analyses that ignore interference effects over-estimate the effect of tuition on
enrollments. Bottou et al. [2013] describe difficulties in using randomized experiments to
study internet ad auctions: Advertisers participate in an auction to determine ad place-
ments, and any intervention on one advertiser may change their behavior on the auction
and thus affect the opportunities available to other advertisers. And, in the presence of
cross-unit interference, basic randomized trials can lead to highly misleading conclusions as
illustrated below in the context of vaccine effectiveness in the presence of herd immunity
[Hudgens and Halloran, 2008, Ogburn and VanderWeele, 2017].
Example 1 (Vaccine Effectiveness and Herd Immunity). Suppose that a policy maker is
considering whether to require mandatory vaccination against a contagious disease in a pop-
ulation that is currently not vaccinated. Denote by Rpµq the probability that a randomly
sampled individual contracts the disease when a fraction µ of the whole population is vac-
cinated. The policy maker wants to compare the case where everyone is vaccinated, Rp1q,
against the status quo without vaccination, Rp0q. A basic randomized trial might involve
vaccinating a small randomly sampled fraction of people in a region, and leave the rest of
the people in that region unvaccinated. Denote by Rˆp1q and Rˆp0q the empirical fraction
of subsequent infections within the treatment group and the (unvaccinated) control group,
respectively. The policy maker would then use Rˆp1q ´ Rˆp0q to estimate the true effect of
vaccination, Rp1q ´Rp0q.
In this example, however, the no-interference assumption does not hold, and thus the
proposed approach to inference is flawed. Due to the interaction among people within the
same geographical vicinity, the risk of infection for any given individual not only depends
on whether they are vaccinated themselves, but also the overall fraction of vaccinated indi-
viduals in the ambient population. Let us denote by V pw, µq the probability that a given
individual contracts the disease in a population where µ fraction is vaccinated and their own
status of vaccination is indicated by w P t0, 1u. Under a reasonable model of contagion, we
may assume that, fixing an individual and their status of vaccination, w, their risk of infec-
tion should be lower when there is a higher level of vaccination in the ambient population.
In other words, we might expect a type of herd immunity, where
V pw, µq ă V pw, µ1q, for all µ ą µ1. (1.1)
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Figure 1: The figure illustrates the failures of a randomized controlled trial (RCT) under
the presence of cross-unit interference (Example 1). The two curves represent the risk of
infection of an individual as a function of the overall fraction of population vaccinated, µ.
The dashed curve corresponds to the risk when the individual is not vaccinated (V p0, ¨q)
and the solid curve when they are (V p1, ¨q).
Note that we may express the overall population risk as Rpµq “ µV p1, µq ` p1´ µqV p0, µq,
where two terms correspond to the event of a randomly chosen individual being vaccinated
or not, respectively.
We are now ready to illustrate the issue with the basic randomized trial in this setting.
The true effect of vaccination is given by Rp1q´Rp0q “ V p1, 1q´V p0, 0q. However, when the
randomized trial described above is performed, we may assume that the overall vaccination
level, µ, remains at 0 since only a vanishingly small fraction of the population is selected for
experimentation. Therefore, the estimator Rˆp1q is actually measuring the marginal impact
of vaccination on a single individual while the population at large remains unvaccinated,
given by V p1, 0q. In other words, we have Rˆp1q ´ Rˆp0q « V p1, 0q ´ V p0, 0q. Because of the
interference effect (1.1), we know that V p1, 1q ą V p1, 0q. Therefore, the naive RCT will
tend to underestimate the actual effectiveness of vaccination. An graphical illustration of
this effect is given in Figure 1.
Experimental Design under Interference The question of how to run experiments in
the presence of cross-unit interference has received considerable attention in the literature.
The simplest approach to dealing with interference is to assume that we can divide our
experimental sample into disjoint clusters that do not interfere with each other, and then to
consider inference at the level of these clusters [Baird et al., 2018, Hudgens and Halloran,
2008].
One such example involves experimentation in internet ad auctions, where each auction
consists of a keyword along with a set of advertisers who submit competing bids in order
for their ads to be displayed when the keyword is queries by a user. There is cross-unit
interference because the same advertiser or keyword may appear in multiple auctions. Basse
et al. [2016] and Ostrovsky and Schwarz [2011] make the observation that the auction type
used for one keyword does not meaningfully affect how advertisers bid for other keywords.
They then consider experiments that group auctions into clusters by their keywords and
randomize auction formats across these keyword clusters, rather than across advertisers, as
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a means to avoid problems with interference. More broadly, in the context of vaccination,
this idea of cluster-level randomization could correspond to identifying communities that are
relatively isolated from each other and randomizing the interventions across communities
rather than across individuals; or, in the case of social networking, it could involve deploying
different versions of a feature in different countries and hope that the number of cross-border
links is small enough to induce only negligible interference.
The limitation of such cluster-based approaches, however, is that the power of any ex-
periment is limited by the number of non-interfering clusters available: For example, if a
platform has 200 million customers in 100 countries, but chooses to randomize by coun-
try, then the largest effective sample size they can use for any experiment is 100, and not
200 million. Recently, several authors have sought to improve on the power of such cluster-
based approaches by considering methods that allow interference to be captured by a generic
graph, where two units are connected by an edge if the treatment assigned to one unit may
affect the other’s outcome [Aronow and Samii, 2017, Athey et al., 2018, Basse et al., 2019,
Eckles et al., 2017, Leung, 2020]. Even in this general case, however, we typically need to
assume that the interference graph is sparse, i.e., that most units do not interfere with each
other. For example, Leung [2020] assumes that the average degree of the interference graph
remains bounded.
Accounting for Interference via Equilibrium Modeling In this paper, we propose
an alternative approach to experimentation in stochastic systems, where a large number
of, if not all, units interfere with one another. For concreteness, we focus on the problem
of setting supply side payments in a centralized marketplace, where available demand is
randomly allocated to a set of available suppliers. In these systems, different suppliers
interact via their effects on the overall supply-demand equilibrium: The more suppliers
choose to participate in the marketplace, the less demand on average an individual supplier
would be able to serve in equilibrium. The objective of the system designer is to identify the
optimal payment that maximizes the platform’s utility. Note that conventional randomized
experimentation schemes that assume no interference fail in this system: For example, if we
double the per-transaction payments made to a random half of suppliers, these suppliers will
be more inclined to participate and reduce the amount of demand available to the remaining
suppliers, and thus reduce their incentives to participate.
We consider a simple model of such a centralized marketplace, and design a class of “lo-
cal” experimentation schemes that—by carefully leveraging the structure of the marketplace—
enable us to optimize payments without disturbing the overall market equilibrium. To do
so, we perturb the per-transaction payment pi available to the i-th supplier by a small mean-
zero shock, i.e., pi “ p` ζεi where 0 ă ζ ! 1 and εi “ ˘1 independently and uniformly at
random. A reduced form linear regression, one that estimates how the individual random
shock ζεi affects supplier-i’s behavior, recovers a certain marginal response function, which
captures the supplier’s sensitivity to payment changes against a fixed ambient market equi-
librium. This marginal response, unfortunately, is not directly relevant for policy design,
as it does not take into account the shift in market equilibrium should all suppliers receive
the same payment change. However, in the limit where the number of suppliers is large,
we show that a mean-field model can be used to translate the output of this reduced form
regression into an estimate of the gradient of the platform’s utility with respect to p. We can
then use these gradient estimates to optimize p via any stochastic first-order optimization
method, such as stochastic gradient descent and its extensions.
The driving insight behind our result is that, although there is dependence across the
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behavior of a large number of units in the system, any such interference can only be chan-
neled through a small number of key statistics: In our example, this corresponds to the total
supply made available by all suppliers. Then, if we can intervene on individual units without
meaningfully affecting the key statistics, we can obtain meaningful information about the
system—at a cost that scales sub-linearly in the number of units. The type of interference
that we consider, where the units experience global interference channeled through a small
number of key statistics, can manifest in a range of applications. We discuss some examples
below.
Example 2 (Ride Sharing). Ride sharing platforms match customers who request a ride
with nearby freelance drivers who are both active and not currently servicing another re-
quest. It is in the interest of the platform to have a reasonable amount of capacity available
at all times to ensure a reliable customer experience. To this end, the platform may seek
to increase capacity by increasing the rates paid to drivers for completing rides. And, when
running experiments on the rates needed to achieve specific capacity levels, the platform
needs to account for interference. If the platform in fact succeeds in increasing capacity by
increasing rates—yet demand remains fixed—the expected utilization of each driver will go
down and so the drivers’ expected revenue, i.e., the product of the rate and the expected
utilization, will not increase linearly in the rate. Thus, if drivers respond to expected rev-
enue when choosing whether to work for a platform, as empirical evidence suggests that
they do [Hall et al., 2019], a platform that ignores interference effects will overestimate the
power of rate hikes to increase capacity. However, as shown in our paper, we can accurately
account for these interference effects via mean-field modeling because they are all channeled
through a simple statistic, in this case total capacity.
Example 3 (Congestion Pricing). A policy maker may want to identify the optimal toll
for congestion pricing [e.g., Goh, 2002]. We assume that drivers get positive utility from
completing a trip, but get negative utility both from congestion delays and from paying
tolls. Then, in studying the effect of a toll on congestion, the policy maker needs to address
the fact that drivers interfere with one another through the overall state of congestion on
the road: If we raise the tolls on a small subset of the drivers and hence discourage them
from going on the road, those whose tolls remain unchanged may experience less congestion
and hence be inclined to drive more. Therefore a policy maker that experiments with a
small sub-population, without taking into account interference effects, may obtain an overly
optimistic estimate of the true effect of a toll change when applied to all drivers. Again,
however, all interference is channeled through a single statistic—congestion—and so mean-
field modeling can capture its effect.
Example 4 (Renewable Energy Subsidies). In an electricity whole sale market, energy pro-
ducers (e.g., generators) and consumers (e.g., utilities) make bids and offers in the day-ahead
market, which is then cleared in a manner that balances the aggregate regional supply and
demand. The operator of these markets, such as CAISO or ERCOT, may choose to provide
subsidies or scheduling priorities to encourage renewable generation [see CAISO, 2009]. Sup-
pose that the market operator would like to know the effect of increasing subsidies on energy
generation. We expect that increased subsidies would increase both total and renewable en-
ergy production; the question is by how much, and what the effect of interference will be.
It is plausible that the effect of subsidies on total supply will be mitigated by interference,
because increased production from one supplier will decrease demand available to others.
In contrast, interference may either mitigate or amplify the effect of subsidies on renewable
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energy production: Amplification effects may occur if subsidies affect profitability in a way
that causes non-renewable producers to be replaced by new renewable entrants. In either
case, all interference effects are channeled through global capacity, and so can be accounted
for via mean-field modeling.
1.1 Related Work
The problem of experimental design under interference has received considerable attention
in the statistics literature. The dominant paradigm has focused on robustness to interfer-
ence, and on defining estimands in settings where some units may be exposed to spillovers
from treating other units [Aronow and Samii, 2017, Athey et al., 2018, Baird et al., 2018,
Basse et al., 2019, Eckles et al., 2017, Hudgens and Halloran, 2008, Leung, 2020, Manski,
2013, Sobel, 2006, Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2012]. Depending on applications,
the exposure patterns may be simple (e.g., the units are clustered such that exposure ef-
fects are contained within clusters) or more complicated (e.g., the units are connected in
a network, and two units far from each other in graph distance are not exposed to each
others’ treatments). Unlike this line of work that seeks robustness to interference driven by
potentially complex and unknown mechanisms, the local randomization scheme proposed
here crucially relies on having a stochastic model that lets us explain interference. Then,
because all inference acts via a simple statistic, we can move beyond simply seeking robust-
ness to interference and can in fact accurately predict interference effect using information
gathered in equilibrium.
Another plausible approach would be to use structural estimation methods and directly
estimate the whole underlying system, and subsequently use stochastic optimization to
obtain the optimal decision. However, a full-blown structural estimation approach would be
infeasible in our problem because it involves a large number of interacting units each with
unknown features. In particular, as will be clear in Section 3, we consider the interaction
among a large number of units, and each unit’s behavior depends on a random choice
function drawn from a potentially large set of options. The set of problem parameters thus
involves the shapes of every possible choice function, as well as sampling distribution with
respect to which the function is drawn for each unit. Directly estimating these parameters
can be very difficult, and as we show, is not needed if the final goal is to identify the optimal
action. Instead, our approach will focus on estimating a small number of key statistics which
turn out to be sufficient for performing optimization. Doing so allows us to side-step the
scalability problem of the structural estimation approach and arrive at the optimal action
in an efficient manner.
The idea that one can distill insights of a structural model down to the relationship
between a small number of observable statistics has a long tradition in economics [e.g.,
Chetty, 2009, Harberger, 1964]. This approach can often be used for practical counterfactual
analysis without needing to fit complicated structural models. We are inspired by this
approach, and here we use such an argument for experimental design rather than to guide
methods for observational study analysis. At a high level, our paper also has a connection
to results on learning in a setting where agents exhibit strategic behavior, including Feng
et al. [2018], Iyer et al. [2014], and Kanoria and Nazerzadeh [2017], and in crowd-sourcing
systems, including Johari et al. [2017], Khetan and Oh [2016] and Massoulie´ and Xu [2018].
Our approach to optimizing p using gradients obtained from local experimentation in-
tersects with the literature on continuous-arm bandits (or noisy zeroth-order optimization),
which aims to optimize a function fpxq by sequentially evaluating f at points x1, x2, . . .,
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and obtaining in return noisy versions of the function values fpx1q, fpx2q, . . . [Bubeck et al.,
2017, Spall, 2005]. A number of bandit methods first generate noisy gradient estimates of
the function by comparing adjacent function values, and subsequently use these estimates in
a first-order optimization method [Flaxman et al., 2005, Ghadimi and Lan, 2013, Jamieson
et al., 2012, Kleinberg, 2005, Nesterov and Spokoiny, 2017]. In our model, this approach
would amount to estimating utility gradients via global experimentation, by comparing the
empirical utilities observed at two different payment levels. Compared to this literature, our
paper exploits a cross-sectional structure not present in most existing zeroth-order models:
We show that our local experimentation approach, which offers slightly different payments
across a large number of units, is far more efficient at estimating the gradient than global ex-
perimentation, which offers all units the same payment on a given day. Such cross-sectional
signals would be lost if we abstracted away the multiplicity of units, and only treated the
average payment as a decision variable to be optimized. In Section 4.4, we provide a for-
mal comparison for the regret of a platform deploying our approach versus a bandit-based
algorithm, and establish sharp separation in terms of rates of convergence.
The limiting regime that we use, one in which the system size tends to infinity, is often
known as the mean-field limit. It has a long history in the study of large-scale stochastic
systems, such as the many-server regime in queueing networks [Bramson et al., 2012, Halfin
and Whitt, 1981, Stolyar, 2015, Tsitsiklis and Xu, 2012, Vvedenskaya et al., 1996] and
interacting particle systems [Graham and Me´le´ard, 1994, Me´zard et al., 1987, Sznitman,
1991]. Likewise, our proposed method leverages a key property of the mean-field limit:
While changes to the behavior of a single unit may have significant impact on other units
in a finite system, such interference diminishes as the system size grows and, in the limit,
the behaviors among any finite set of units become asymptotically independent from one
another, a phenomenon known as the propagation of chaos [Bramson et al., 2012, Graham
and Me´le´ard, 1994, Sznitman, 1991]. This asymptotic independence property underpins
the effectiveness of our local experimentation scheme, and ensures that small, symmetric
payment perturbations do not drastically alter the equilibrium demand-supply dynamics.
Our work thus suggests that, just as mean-field models have been successful in the analysis
of stochastic systems, they may be a useful paradigm for designing experiments in large
stochastic systems.
2 Designing Experiments under Equilibrium Effects
For concreteness, we focus our discussion on a simple setting inspired by a centralized
marketplace for freelance labor that operates over a number of periods. In each period,
the high-level objective of the decision maker (i.e., operator of the platform) is to match
demand with a pool of potential suppliers in such a manner that maximizes the platform’s
expected utility. To do so, the decision maker offers payments to each potential supplier
individually, who in turn decides whether to become active/available based upon their belief
of future revenue. Our main question is how the decision maker can use experimentation
to efficiently discover their revenue-maximizing payment, despite not knowing the detailed
parameterization of the model, and the presence of substantial stochastic uncertainty.
We formally describe a flexible stochastic model in Section 3; here, we briefly outline
a simple variant of our model that lets us highlight some key properties of our approach.
Each day t “ 1, ..., T there are i “ 1, ..., n potential suppliers, and demand for Dt identical
tasks to be accomplished. A central platform chooses a distribution pit, and then offers each
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supplier random payments Pit
iid„ pit they commit to pay for each unit of demand served.
The suppliers observe both pit a state variable At that can be used to accurately anticipate
demand Dt (e.g., At could capture local weather or events); however, the platform does not
have access to At. Given their knowledge of Pit and At, each supplier independently chooses
to become “active”; we write Zit “ 1 for active suppliers and Zit “ 0 else. Then, demand
Dt is randomly allocated to active suppliers.
Our key assumption is that each supplier chooses to become active based on their ex-
pected revenue conditionally on being active: They first compute qAtppitq, their expected
allocation rate (rate at which they will be matched with demand) conditionally on being
active and given At and pit. They then decide whether to become active by comparing
the expected revenue PitqAtppitq with a random outside option.1 The form of qp¨q depends
on both the amount of available supply and demand, and the efficiency with which supply
can be matched with demand; see Section 3 for an example based on a queuing network.
Finally, the platform’s utility Ut is given by the revenue from the demand served minus
payments made to suppliers. Figure 2 shows a simple example of an equilibrium resulting
from this model in the limit as n gets large in a setting where all suppliers are offered the
same payment p, for a specific realization of demand D. We see that, as p gets larger, the
active supply gets larger than demand and the utilization of active suppliers goes down.
Conversely, our assumption that the platform cannot observe the daily state variable
At is made to ensure that our learning problem isn’t too “easy” and, in particular, that
the platform cannot use knowledge about the At to derive information about the system
without running experiments. In practice, of course, it is plausible that a platform may have
access to partial—but not full—information about At. Here, we focus on the statistically
most difficult setting where the platform is oblivious to At and thus can only learn how to
set p via experimentation, as this setting enables us to establish a crisp separation between
different approaches to learning and to highlight our core methodological contributions.
However, all methods considered here can be adapted to leverage partial information about
At, and further work that investigates how best to leverage such information would be of
considerable interest.
Before presenting our proposed approach to learning p below, we first briefly review why
standard approaches fall short. The core difficulty in our model comes from the interplay
between network effects and market-wide demand fluctuations induced by the At.
The network effects break what one might call classical A/B-experimentation. Suppose
that, on each day t “ 1, ..., T , the platform chose a small random fraction of suppliers and
offer them an experimental payment pexp, while everyone else gets offered the status quo
payment pdefault. We could then try to use the behavior of suppliers offered pexp to estimate
expected profit at pexp, and then update the default payment. This approach allows for
cheap experimentation because most of the suppliers get offered pdefault. However, it will
not consistently recover the optimal payment because it ignores feedback effects: When we
raise payments, more suppliers opt to join the market and so the rate at which any given
supplier is matched with demand goes down—and this attenuates the payment-sensitivity
of supply relative to what is predicted by A/B testing.
Conversely, the market-wide demand fluctuations due to At degrade global optimization
schemes that use payment variation across days for learning; such algorithms are equiva-
lent to continuous-armed bandit algorithms considered in the optimization literature [Spall,
1Here, we assume that suppliers don’t take into account the effect of their own decision to become active
on their expected allocation rate. This is often taken to be a reasonable assumption in large stochastic
systems [e.g., Chetty, 2009].
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Figure 2: Example of large-sample behavior of market, conditionally on a realization of A.
We show µAppq, the fraction of suppliers that choose to become active, qAppq the expected
amount of demand served per active supplier and µAppqqAppq the expected amount of de-
mand served (expressed as a multiple of the maximum capacity that would be available if all
suppliers were active). The example is simulated in the mean-field limit, i.e., with number
of potential suppliers n growing to infinity, such that E
“
D{n ˇˇA‰ “ 0.4. Individual supplier
preferences are logistic (3.7) with α “ 1 with outside option logpBi{20q „ N p0, 1q. Supply-
demand matching is characterized via the allocation function (3.5) with L “ 8, visualized
in Figure 5.
2005]. Suppose that, on each day t “ 1, ..., T , we randomly chose a payment pt and made it
available to all suppliers, and then observed realized profits Ut. We could then try estimate
profit gradients by comparing Ut to Ut´1. The problem is that, due to variation in daily
context, the variation in per-supplier profit Ut{n given the chosen payment pt is always of
constant order, even in very large markets (i.e., in the limit n Ñ 8); for example, in a
ride-sharing setting, if day t´ 1 is rainy and day t is sunny, then the effect of this weather
change on profit may overwhelm the effect of any payment change deployed by the plat-
form.2 The upshot is that the platform cannot learn anything via global experimentation
unless it considers large changes to the payments pt that it offers to everyone. And such
wide-spread payment changes are impractical for several reasons: They are expensive, and
difficult to deploy.
2Of course, the platform may try to correct for contexts, e.g., by matching days with similar values of At
with each other. One currently popular way of doing so in the technology industry is using synthetic controls
[Abadie et al., 2010]. In practice, however, this approach may be difficult to implement, and will remain
intractably noisy unless the platform can observe the full context At and use it to essentially perfectly
predict demand. As discussed above, our goal in this paper is to develop methods for learning that are
driven purely by experimentation, and that do not rely on the platform being able to accurately observe At.
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2.1 Local Experimentation
Our goal is to use high-level information about the stochastic system described above to
design a new experimental framework that lets us avoid the problems of both approaches
described above: We want our experimental scheme to be consistent for the optimal payment
(like global experimentation), but also to be cost-effective (like classical A/B testing) in that
it only requires small perturbations to the status quo.
The driving insight behind our approach is that it is possible to learn about the relation-
ship between profit and payment via unobstrusive randomization by randomly perturbing
the payments Pit offered to supplier i in time period t. We propose setting
3
Pit “ pt ` ζεit, εit iid„ t˘1u (2.1)
uniformly at random, where ζ ą 0 is a (small) constant that governs the magnitude of the
perturbations, and regressing market participation Zit on the payment perturbations εit.
This regression lets us recover the marginal response function, i.e., the average payment
sensitivity of a supplier in a situation where only they get different payments but others do
not; see Section 3.2 for a formal definition.
This marginal response function is not directly of interest for optimizing p, as it ignores
feedback effects. However, we find that—in our setting—this quantity captures relevant
information for optimizing payments. More specifically we show in Section 3.2 that, provided
we have good enough understanding of system dynamics to be able to anticipate match rates
given the amount of supply and demand present in the market, in the mean-field limit where
the market size grows, we can use consistent estimates of the marginal response function
to derive consistent estimates of the actual payment-sensitivity of supply that accounts for
network effects. Furthermore, we show in Section 4 that this approach enables us to optimize
payments using vanishingly small-scale experimentation as the market gets large (i.e., we
can take ζ in (2.1) to be very small when n is large).
Figure 3 shows results from our local experimentation approach on a simple simula-
tion experiment in the setting of Figure 2, where the scaled demand E
“
D{n ˇˇA‰ follows a
betap15, 35q distribution. We initialize the system at p1 “ 30, and then each day run pay-
ment perturbations as in (2.1) to guide a payment update using an update rule described in
Section 4.2. We see that the system quickly converges to a near-optimal payment of around
17.
We also compare our results to what one could obtain using the baseline of global exper-
imentation, where we randomize the payment pt „ Uniformp10, 30q in each time period and
measure resulting platform utility Ut, and then choose the final payment pˆ by maximizing
a smooth estimate of the expectation of Ut given pt. The left panel of Figure 4 shows the
resulting ppt, Utq pairs, as well as the resulting pˆ. As seen in the right panel of Figure 3,
the final pˆ obtained via this method is a reasonable estimate of the optimal p.
The major difference between the local and global randomization schemes is in the
resulting cost of experimentation. In Section 4.3 we show that our local experimentation
scheme pays a vanishing cost for randomization; the only regret relative to deploying the
optimal p from the start is due to the rate of convergence of gradient descent. In contrast,the
3Procedurally, this algorithm is closely related to a batched bandit algorithm [Perchet et al., 2016], where
an analyst sequentially picks actions for one batch of units at a time. However, existing work on batched
bandits, including Perchet et al. [2016], focuses on a setting without cross-unit interference, i.e., where the
action taken on one unit doesn’t affect the rewards experienced by other units in the same batch. Thus,
results on batched bandits cannot be used here.
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Figure 3: Results from learning p via local experimentation. The worker preference functions
are as in Figure 2; the daily contexts are such that E
“
D{n ˇˇA‰ „ betap15, 35q. The platform
utility function is linear as in Lemma 3, with γ “ 100. We learned gradients based on local
randomization (2.1) with ζ “ 0.5, and then optimized payments via gradient descent as in
(4.5) with a step size η “ 20 and I “ p´8, 8q. The left panel shows the convergence of
the pt to the value p
˚ that optimizes mean utility. The right panel compares the average
value of pt over the last 100 steps of our algorithm to both a payment pˆ learned via global
experimentation and the optimal payment p˚.
cost of experimentation incurred for finding pˆ via global experimentation is huge, because
it needs to sometimes deploy very poor choices of pt in order to learn anything. And, as
shown in the right panel of Figure 4, after the first few days, the global experimentation
approach in fact systematically achieves lower daily utilities Ut than local experimentation.
In Section 6 we consider further numerical comparisons of local and global experimenta-
tion, as well as variants of global exploration that balance exploration and exploitation to
improve in-sample regret.
3 Model: Stochastic Market with Centralized Pricing
We now present the general stochastic model we use to motivate our approach. All random
variables are assumed to be independent across the periods and, within each period, are
independent from one another unless otherwise stated. We will consider a sequence of
systems, indexed by n P N, where in the nth system there are n potential suppliers. We will
refer to n as the market size. All variables in our model are thus implicitly dependent on
the index, n, which we denote using the superscript pnq, e.g., qpnq. We sometimes suppress
this notation when the context is clear. In the rest of the section, we will focus on describing
the model in a single time period.
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Figure 4: Results from learning p via global experimentation. The left panel shows pairs
ppt, Utq resulting from daily experiments, along with both the resulting pˆ (dash-dotted line)
and the optimal p˚ (dotted line). The right panel shows the (scaled) difference in daily
utility between our local experimentation approach and the global experimentation baseline
(both approaches worked using the same demand sequence Dt).
Demand To reflect the reality that demand fluctuations may not concentrate with n, we
allow for a random stochastic global state A drawn from a finite set A. The global state
affects demand, and is known to market participants (suppliers), but not to the platform (or
the platform cannot react to it). For example, in a ride sharing example, A could capture the
effect of weather (rain / shine) or major events (conference, sports game, etc.). Conditionally
on the global state A “ a, we assume that demand, D, is drawn from distribution D „ Fa.
We further assume that the demand scales proportionally with respect to the market size n,
and that it concentrates after re-scaling by 1{n. In particular, we assume that there exists
tdauaPA Ă R`, such that for all a P A, E rD{n|A “ as “ da for all n P N,
lim
nÑ8E
”
pD{n´ daq2
ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
“ 0, (3.1)
and
P
`
D{n R rda{2, 2das
ˇˇ
A “ a˘ “ op1{nq, (3.2)
and as nÑ 8. In general, we will use the sub-script a to denote the conditioning that the
global state A “ a.
Matching Demand with Suppliers Depending on the realization of demand, all or a
subset of the suppliers will be selected to serve the demand. In particular, the matching
between the potential suppliers and demand occurs in three rounds:
Round 1: The platform chooses a payment distribution, pi, and draws payments Pi
iid„ pi
for i “ 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, for each supplier i, the platform announces both the payment
12
Pi and the underlying distribution pi, with the understanding that the supplier will be
compensated with Pi for every unit of demand that they will be matched with eventually.
Round 2: Suppliers choose whether to they want to be active. A supplier will not be
matched with any demand if they choose to be inactive. We write Zi P t0, 1u to denote
whether the i-th participant chooses to participate in the marketplace, and write T “řn
i“1 Zi as the total number of active suppliers. The mechanism through which a supplier
determines whether or not to become active will be described shortly.
Round 3: The platform employs some mechanism that randomly matches demand with
active suppliers.
Denote by Si the amount of demand that an active supplier i will be able to serve, and
define
Ωpd, tq fi ErSi
ˇˇ
D “ d, T “ ts, (3.3)
as the expected demand allocation to an active supplier under the payment distribution pi,
conditional on the total demand being d and total active suppliers being t. We allow for
a range of possible matching mechanisms, but assume that in the limiting regime where t
and d are large, Ωpd, tq converges to a “regular allocation function” that only depends on
the ratio between the demand and active suppliers, d{t.
Definition 5 (Regular Allocation Function). A function ω : R` Ñ r0, 1s is a regular
allocation function if it satisfies the following:
1. ωp¨q is smooth, concave and non-decreasing.
2. limxÑ0 ωpxq “ 0 and limxÑ8 ωpxq ď 1.
3. limxÑ0 ω1pxq ď 1.
The condition of ω being concave corresponds to the assumption that the marginal diffi-
culty with which additional demand can be matched does not decrease as demand increases.
The condition that limxÑ8 ωpxq ď 1 asserts that the maximum capacity of all active sup-
pliers be bounded after normalization.
Assumption 1. The function Ω : R2` Ñ R` satisfies the following:
1. Ωpd, tq is non-decreasing in d, and non-increasing in t.
2. There exists a bounded error function l : R2` Ñ R` with
|lpd, tq| “ o
´
1{?t` 1{?d
¯
, (3.4)
such that Ωpd, tq “ ωpd{tq ` lpd, tq for all t, d P R`, where ωp¨q is a regular allocation
function.
We provide below an example system in which the allocation rates are given by a regular
allocation function (Definition 5).
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Figure 5: Examples of the regular allocation function ωp¨q in Example 6 under different
values of capacity L.
Example 6 (Regular Allocation Function Example: Parallel Finite-Capacity Queues). Con-
sider a service system where each active supplier operates as a single-server M{M{1 queue
with a finite capacity, L P N, L ě 2. A request that arrives at a queue is accepted if and
only if the queue length is less than or equal to L, and is otherwise dropped. We assume
that all servers operate at unit-rate, so that a request’s service time is an independent expo-
nential random variable with mean 1. Each unit demand generates an independent stream
of requests which is modeled by a unit-rate Poisson process, so that the aggregate arrival
process of requests is Poisson with rate D (by the merging property of independent Poisson
processes). When a new request is generated within the system, the platform routes it to
one of the T queues selected uniformly at random. The random routing corresponds, for
instance, to a scenario where both the incoming requests and active suppliers are scattered
across a geographical area, and as such, requests are assigned to the nearest server.
Within this model, each active supplier effectively functions an M{M{1 queue with
service rate 1 and arrival rate D{T . Due to the capacity limit at L, some requests may be
dropped if they are assigned to a queue currently at capacity. Using the theory of M{M{1
queues, it is not difficult to show that (cf. Eq. (5.6) of [Spencer et al., 2014]) if we denote
D{T by x, then the rate at which requests are processed by a server, corresponding to the
allocation rate, is given by
ωpxq “
#
x´xL
1´xL , x ‰ 1,
1´ 1L , x “ 1.
(3.5)
Numerical examples of ωp¨q are given in Figure 5. Note that ωp¨q satisfies all conditions in
Definition 5 and is hence a regular allocation function. Finally, we may generalize the model
to where the suppliers are partitioned into k equal-sized groups, so that each sever operates
at speed Tkm. The corresponding allocation function would have the same qualitative
behavior.
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Supplier Choice Behavior We assume that each supplier takes into account their ex-
pected revenue in equilibrium when making the decision of whether or not to become active.
In particular, the of supplier i becoming active is given as follows, where T is the equilibrium
number of active suppliers:
µpnqa ppiq fi Ppi
“
Zi “ 1
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ “ Epi “fBipPi Epi “ΩpD,T q ˇˇA “ a‰q ˇˇA “ a‰ . (3.6)
Here, Epi rΩpD,T q |A “ as is the expected amount of demand served by each supplier given
the platform’s choice of pi, and thus Pi Epi rΩpD,T q |A “ as is the expected revenue of the i-
th supplier in mean-field equilibrium.4 Bi is a private feature that captures the heterogeneity
across potential suppliers, such as a supplier’s cost, or noise in their estimate of the expected
revenue. We assume that the Bi’s are drawn i.i.d. from a set B whose distribution may
depend on A. The choice function fbpxq represents the of the supplier becoming active,
when their private feature is b and expected equilibrium revenue is x. We assume the family
of choice functions tfbp¨qubPB satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 2. For all b P B, the choice function fbp¨q takes values in r0, 1s, is monotonically
non-decreasing, and twice differentiable with a uniformly bounded second derivative.
Below is one example of a family of choice functions that satisfies Assumption 2:
Example 7 (Logistic Choice Function). A popular model in choice theory is the logit model
(cf. Chapter 3 of Train [2009]), which, in our context, corresponds to the choice function
being the logistic function:
P
“
Zi “ 1
ˇˇ
Pi, pi, A
‰ “ 1
1` e´α
´
PiEpi
”
ΩpD,T q
ˇˇ
A
ı
´Bi
¯ , (3.7)
where α ą 0 is a parameter and the private feature Bi takes values in R` and represent the
break-even cost threshold of supplier i. In this example, the supplier’s decision on whether
to activate will depend on whether their expected revenue exceeds their break-even cost.
The sensitivity of such dependence is modeled by the parameter α. Note that in the limit
as αÑ8, the probability of the event Zi “ 1 conditionally on Pi, pi and A is either 0 or 1.
That is, a supplier will choose to be active if and only if they believe their expected revenue
from Round 2 will exceed the break-even threshold Bi.
Platform Utility and Objective The platform’s utility is defined to be the difference
between revenue and total payment:
U “ RpD, T q ´
nÿ
i“1
PiZiSi, (3.8)
where Si is the amount of demand that a supplier would serve if they become active, and
RpD,T q is the platform’s expected revenue, with equilibrium active supply size T and total
demand D. Analogously to the case of ΩpD,T q, we will assume that the revenue function
R is approximately linear in the sense that, for some function r, RpD, T q « rpD{T qT when
T and D are large. More precisely, assume the following:
4For now, assume that such equilibrium distribution is well defined, and we will justify its meaning
rigorously in a moment.
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Assumption 3. There exists a bounded error function l : R2` Ñ R` with |lpd, tq| “
op1{?t` 1{?dq such that
Rpd, tq “ prpd{tq ´ lpd, tqq t, for all t, d P R`, (3.9)
where r : R` Ñ R` is a smooth function with bounded derivatives.
As an example, the platform could receive a fixed amount γ from each unit of demand
served, in which case we have RpD,T q “ γpTΩpD,T qq. Given this notation, we write the
platform’s expected utility in the n-th system as
upnqa ppiq “ 1nEn
“
U
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ , and upnqppiq “ En ”upnqA ppiqı . (3.10)
Denote by δx the Dirac measure with unit mass on x. We consider two different objectives
for the decision maker (i.e., platform operator). First, they may want to control regret,
and deploy a sequence of payment distributions pi whose utility nearly matches that of the
optimal fixed payment, p˚. Second, they may want to estimate p˚. In Section 4, we provide
results with guarantees along both objectives.
Symmetric Payment Perturbation An important family of payment distributions that
will be used repeatedly throughout the paper is that of symmetric payment perturbation.
Let tεiuiPN be a sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with Ppεi “ ´1q “ Ppεi “
`1q “ 12 . Fix p ą ζ ą 0. We say the payments are ζ-perturbed from p, if
Pi “ p` ζεi, i P N. (3.11)
In what follows, we will use pip,ζ to denote the payment distribution when payments are
ζ-perturbed from p, µ
pnq
a pp, ζq to denote µpnqa ppip,ζq. The meanings of µpnqa pp, ζq, upnqa pp, ζq,
etc., are to be understood analogously. When ζ “ 0, we may omit the dependence on ζ and
write, for instance, µ
pnq
a ppq in place of µpnqa pp, 0q or µpnqa ppip,0q.
Remark 1 (What does the platform know?). Our model assumes that the platform has
detailed knowledge of the allocation mechanics, but cannot anticipate the behaviors of mar-
ket participants that drive of supply and demand. More specifically, we assume that the
platform knows the regular allocation function ω (Definition 5), and its pre-limit version,
Ω (3.3); the limiting platform utility function r (Assumption 3), and its pre-limt version, R
(3.8); as well as the payment scheme it chooses to use, i.e., p, ζ, and the realizations of the
random perturbations, tεiui“1,...,n. However, the platform cannot anticipate the global state
A, the demand D, or the distribution of supplier choice functions fBip¨q; rather, all it can
do is collect after-the-fact measurements of D and tZiui“1,...,n, the set of active suppliers.
This modeling choice reflects an understanding that it is realistic for a platform to
have a good handle on the mechanics of the marketplace it controls, but it is implausible
for it to have an in-depth understanding of the beliefs and preferences of all marketplace
participants. For example, in the case of ride sharing, it is plausible that a platform could
get good at modeling congestion, but less plausible that the platform could fully understand
and anticipate how all its drivers may respond to various policy changes.
The fact that we take the platform to be completely oblivious to the global state A puts
us in an extreme setting, where the platform’s learning task as hard as possible: Because the
platform cannot work with A, any learning must be purely driven by randomization in p. We
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chose this extreme setting because it crystallizes the difficulty of the learning problem, and
highlights the value of local experimentation relative to global experimentation baselines.
In practice, of course, the platform may have some information about the global state A;
for example, we may assume that the platform observes a set of covariates X that capture
some aspects of A (e.g., we could have X “ ΞpAq for some lossy function Ξ). In such
a setting, the information X could be used for variance reduction and/or learning better
policies that exploit heterogeneity explained by X. It would be of considerable interest to
study a covariate-enriched variant of our approach that allows the platform to use such
information to learn better policies; however, we leave this line of investigation to follow-up
work.
3.1 Mean-Field Limits
The model described above is framed in terms of an equilibrium active supply size, T . We
now provide a formal definition, and verify existence and uniqueness.
Definition 8 (Active Supply Size in Equilibrium). We say that a random variable T is an
equilibrium supply size, if, when all suppliers make activation choices according to (3.6), the
resulting distribution for the number of active suppliers equals that of T .
Lemma 1. Suppose that the conditions in Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Fix p ą 0, ζ P r0, pq,
and a P A. Let the payment distribution pi be defined on R`. Then, conditional on A “ a,
the equilibrium active supply size exists, is unique, and follows a Binomial distribution.
Next, we define some quantities that will play a key role in our analysis, and verify
that they converge to tractable mean-field limits. The first quantity we consider is the
equilibrium number of active suppliers µ
pnq
a ppq, as defined in (3.6). Second, we define the
function qp¨q, which captures the expected amount of demand matched to each supplier if
the total number of suppliers were exogenously drawn as a binomial pn, µq random variable
rather than determined by the equilibrium:
qpnqa pµq “ E rΩ pD,Xq |A “ as , X „ Binomialpn, µq. (3.12)
Lemma 2. Under the conditions of Lemma 1, for all a P A, and p, µ P R`, the following
hold:
lim
nÑ8µ
pnq
a ppq “ µappq, (3.13)
lim
nÑ8 q
pnq
a pµq “ ωpda{µq, (3.14)
lim
nÑ8u
pnq
a ppq “ uappq “ prpda{µappqq ´ pωpda{µappqqqµappq, (3.15)
lim
nÑ8pq
pnq
a q1pµq “ ´ω1pda{µqdaµ2 , (3.16)
where ωp¨q and rp¨q are described in Definition 5 and Assumption 3, respectively. In (3.13),
the limit µappq is the only solution to µ “ E
“
fB1 ppωpda{µqq
ˇˇ
A “ a‰.
Finally, the following result, proven in Appendix A.1, establishes conditions under which
the limiting utility functions uappq are concave, thus enabling us to globally optimize utility
via first-order methods.
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Lemma 3. Let fap¨q be the average choice function: fapxq “ E
“
fB1pxq
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ . Fix γ ą 0,
c0 P p0, γq and a P A. Suppose the following holds:
1. We have a linear revenue function, rpxq “ γωpxq .
2. Let x “ infpPpc0,γq pqapµappqq and x “ suppPpc0,γq pqapµappqq. The average choice
function fap¨q satisfies
(a) fap¨q is strongly concave in the domain px, xq.
(b) fapxq´f 1apxqx ě 0, or, equivalently, that there exists a differentiable, non-negative
concave function f˜p¨q, such that f˜pxq “ fapxq and f˜ 1pxq ď f 1apxq.
3. The allocation function ωp¨q is strongly concave in the domain pda{µapc0q, da{µapγqq.
Then, under the conditions of Lemma 1, the limiting platform utility uap¨q is strongly concave
in the domain pc0, γq.
3.2 The Marginal Response Function
Finally, as discussed in Section 2, a key quantity that motivates our approach to exper-
imentation is the marginal response function, ∆ppq, which captures the average payment
sensitivity of a supplier in a situation where only they get different payments but others do
not (meaning that there are no network effects).
Definition 9 (Marginal Response Function). Fix n P N, a P A and p ą 0. The marginal
response function is defined by
∆pnqa ppq “ qpnqa
´
µpnqa ppqq
¯
E
”
f 1B1
´
pqpnqa
´
µpnqa ppqq
¯¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
. (3.17)
This marginal response function ∆ plays a key role in our analysis for the following
reasons. First, as shown in the following section, in the mean-field limit as n Ñ 8, ∆ is
easy to estimate using small random payment perturbations that do not meaningfully affect
the overall equilibrium. Second, provided we have a good enough understanding of the
underlying system dynamics to know the appropriate allocation function ωp¨q, we can use
consistent estimates of ∆ to estimate the true payment sensitivity of supply that accounts
for feedback effects, dµppq{dp. This fact is formalized in the following result. We note that,
other than ∆, all terms on the right-hand side of (3.20) are readily estimated from observed
data by taking averages.
Lemma 4. Under the conditions of Lemma 1, for any a P A and p P R`, we have that
d
dp
µpnqa ppq “ ∆
pnq
a ppq
1´ p∆pnqa ppq qpnq1a
´
µ
pnq
a ppq
¯
{qpnqa
´
µ
pnq
a ppqq
¯ for any n ě 1. (3.18)
Furthermore, this relationship carries through in the mean-field limit,
lim
nÑ8∆
pnq
a ppq “ ∆appq fi ω pda{µappqqE
“
f 1B1 ppω pda{µappqqq
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ , (3.19)
lim
nÑ8
d
dp
µpnqa ppq “ µ1appq “ ∆appq
M ˆ
1` pda∆appqω
1 pda{µappqq
µappq2ωpda{µappqq
˙
. (3.20)
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In addition to powering our approach to experimentation, the result of Lemma 4 also
provides qualitative insights about the drivers of interference in our model. If there were
no interference among the suppliers, then the gradient pd{dpqµappq would have coincided
with the marginal response ∆appq; but due to interference, the gradient is attenuated by an
interference factor 1`Rappq, where
Rappq “ Σ∆a ppqΣΩa ppq, Σ∆a ppq “ p∆appqµappq ,loooooooooomoooooooooon
scaled marginal sensitivity
ΣΩa ppq “ daµappq
ω1pda{µappqq
ωpda{µappqq .loooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooon
scaled matching elasticity
(3.21)
We thus observe the following:
• The interference factor is negligible when the “scaled marginal sensitivity” Σ∆a ppq is
small, i.e., the marginal response function is small relative to the current supply µappq.
Note that p∆appq is a scale-free version our marginal response function that is invariant
to rescaling p.
• The interference factor is negligible when the “scaled matching elasticity” ΣΩa ppq is
small, i.e., the elasticity of the matching function ωp¨q is small relative to the current
ratio of supply to demand µappq{da. In particular, because ωp¨q is concave and bounded
by assumption, we can verify that ΣΩa ppq is small whenever demand far exceeds supply,
i.e. da{µappq " 1; see Proposition 5 stated below and proven in Appendix A.2.
• The interference factor is non-negligible when neither of the above conditions hold.
These observations are aligned with what one might have anticipated based on qualitative
arguments. For example, interference effects clearly cannot matter if marketplace partic-
ipants are overall unresponsive to changes in p, and this is exactly what we found in the
first bullet point. Meanwhile, one might have expected for the effect of interference to be
more pronounced when there is more intense competition among the suppliers than when
there is enough demand to keep all suppliers busy, and this conjecture is well in line with
our finding in the second bullet point.
Proposition 5. Let g : R` Ñ R` be concave with piecewise continuous derivative g1. Then
xg1pxq ď gpxq for all x ą 0. If moreover 0 ă limxÑ8 gpxq ă 8, then limxÑ8 xg1pxq{gpxq “
0.
4 Learning via Local Experimentation
We present our main results in this section. The main framework we adopt for learning
payments is based on first-order optimization. First, we show in Section 4.1 that our local
experimentation approach enables us to construct an asymptotically accurate estimate of
the utility gradient at a given payment p, in the mean-field limit as n Ñ 8. Then, we use
these gradient estimates to update the payment using a form of gradient ascent, and show
that their performance is superior to what can be achieved via classical continuous-armed
bandit and zeroth-order optimization algorithms. Specifically, we establish in Section 4.2
an Op1{T q upper bound for the rate of convergence to the optimal platform utility under
our algorithm. In Section 4.3, we study the cost of the local experimentation needed to
estimate utility gradients, and verify that it scales sub-linearly in n. Finally in Section 4.4,
we compare our results to those available to classical continuous-armed bandits, and show
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that it is not possible to achieve the Op1{T q convergence rate within the classical bandit
framework. Throughout this section, we focus on optimizing utility in the mean-field limit,
while verifying that finite-n errors have an asymptotically vanishing effect on learning.
4.1 Estimating Utility Gradients
Recall that, in our model, there are two sources of randomness. First, there is the stochastic
global context A P A, which affects overall demand. In the context of ride-sharing, A could
capture multiplicative demand fluctuations due to weather or holidays. Second, there is
randomness due to decisions of individual market participants. This second source of error
decays with market size size n. Our goal here is to verify that local experimentation allows
us to eliminate errors of the second type via concentration as the market size n gets large.
Conversely, because the context A affects everyone in the same way, there is no way to
average out the effect of A without collecting data across many days.
Define sZ “ 1n řni“1 Zi and sD “ D{n. As discussed in Section 2 our proposal starts for
perturbing individual payments as in (3.11), and then estimating the regression coefficientp∆ of market participation Zi on the perturbation ζnεi, i.e.,
p∆ “ ζ´1n nÿ
i“1
pZi ´ sZqpεi ´ ε¯q L nÿ
i“1
pεi ´ ε¯q2. (4.1)
Our first result below relates this quantity p∆ we can estimate via local randomization to
a quantity that is more directly relevant to estimating payments, namely the payments
derivative of u conditionally on the global state A.
Theorem 6. Suppose the conditions of Lemma 1 hold. Let
pΥ “ p∆{˜1` p sD p∆ω1 ` sD{ sZ˘sZ2ω ` sD{ sZ˘
¸
, (4.2)
and
pΓ “ pΥ “r ` sD{ sZ˘´ pω ` sD{ sZ˘´ `r1 ` sD{ sZ˘´ pω1 ` sD{ sZ˘˘ sD{ sZ‰´ ω ` sD{ sZ˘ sZ. (4.3)
Then, assuming that the perturbations scale as ζn “ ζn´α for some 0 ă α ă 0.5,
lim
nÑ8P
„∣∣∣∣pΓ´ ddpuA ppq
∣∣∣∣ ą ε “ 0, (4.4)
for any ε ą 0.
Remark 2 (Population-wide Experimentation & Symmetric Perturbation). It is instructive
to note that our experimentation scheme in (3.11) has two distinguishing features that depart
from a conventional approach to A/B testing that would gave a small subset of suppliers
an ε increase in payment while keeping payments in the rest of the population unchanged.
First, our perturbation is symmetric across the units (zero-mean perturbation), whereas in
classical settings those in a treatment group may receive asymmetric, and possibly identical,
treatments. Second, we experiment across the entire population as opposed to a small sub-
population.
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These features are in fact deliberate and interdependent, and the rationales are as fol-
lows. The perturbations being symmetric ensures that our experimentation scheme does not
meaningfully shift the overall supply-demand equilibrium (µ
pnq
a ppq), which in turn allows us
to circumvent the impact of cross-unit interference. Moreover, as we show in Section 4.3,
the symmetric perturbations lead to a small cost of experimentation: Roughly speaking,
the effect of paying half of the population ε more is roughly neutralized by simultaneously
paying the other half ε less. Meanwhile, the fact that we experiment on the whole popula-
tion enables us to attain reasonable power using small enough perturbations ε such as not
to be biased by the curvature of the supplier-specific choice functions fbp¨q.
4.2 A First-Order Algorithm
Our key use of Theorem 6 involves optimizing for a utility-maximizing p. At every time
period t, pΓt is a consistent estimate of the gradient of uAtp¨q at pt´1, and we can plug it into
any first-order optimization method that allows for noisy gradients. The proposal below is a
variant of mirror descent that allows us to constraint the pt to an interval I [e.g., Beck and
Teboulle, 2003]. We need to specify a step size η, an interval I “ rc´, c`s, and an initial
payment p1. Then, at time period t “ 1, 2, ..., we do the following:
1. Deploy randomized payment perturbations (3.11) around pt to estimate pΓt as in (4.3),
2. Perform a gradient update5
pt`1 “ argminp
#
1
2η
tÿ
s“1
spp´ psq2 ´ θtp : p P I
+
, θt “
tÿ
s“1
spΓs. (4.5)
The following result shows that if we run our method for T time periods in a large market-
place and the reward functions uap¨q are strongly concave, then the utility derived by our
first-order optimization scheme is competitive with any fixed payment level p, up to regret
that decays as 1{t.6
Theorem 7. Under the conditions of Theorem 6, suppose we run the above learning algo-
rithm for T time periods and that uap¨q is σ-strongly concave over the interval p P I for all
a. Suppose, moreover, that we run (4.5) with step size η ą σ´1 and that the gradients of u
are bounded, i.e., |u1appq| ăM for all p P I and a P A. Then
lim
nÑ8P
«
1
T
Tÿ
t“1
t puAtppq ´ uAtpptqq ď ηM
2
2
ff
“ 1, (4.6)
for any p P I and T ě 1.
The above result doesn’t make any distributional assumptions on the contexts At; rather,
(4.6) bounds the regret of our payment sequence p1, p2, ... along the realized sample path of
At relative to any fixed oracle. We believe this aspect of our result to be valuable in many
5Note that, without the constraint to the interval I, this update is equivalent to basic gradient descent
with pt`1 “ pt ` 2ηpΓt{pt` 1q.
6In (4.6), we up-weight the regret terms uAt ppq ´ uAt pptq in later time periods to emphasize their 1{t
rate of decay. One could also use an analogous proof to verify that the unweighted average regret is bounded
on the order of T´1
řT
t“1 puAt ppq ´ uAt pptqq “ OP plogpT qq.
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situations: For example, if At needs to capture weather phenomena that have a big effect
on demand, it is helpful not to need to model the distribution of At, as the weather may
have complex dependence in time as well as long-term patterns. However, if we are willing
to assume that the At are independent and identically distributed, Theorem 7 also implies
that an appropriate average of our learned payments is consistent for the optimal payment
via online-to-batch conversion [Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2004].
Corollary 8. Under the conditions of Theorem 7, suppose moreover that the At are inde-
pendent and identically distributed and let uppq “ E ruAtppqs. Then, for any δ ą 0,
lim sup
nÑ8
P
„
pp˚ ´ p¯T q2 ď ηM
2
σT
`
16 log
`
δ´1
˘` 4˘ ě 1´ δ, (4.7)
where p˚ “ argmax tuppq : p P Iu and p¯T “ 2T pT`1q
řT
t“1 t pt.
4.3 The Cost of Experimentation
Our argument so far has proceeded in two parts. In Section 4.1 we showed we could consis-
tently use local experimentation to estimate gradients of the utility function uappq. Then, in
Section 4.2, we gave bounds on the regret that updates payments pt via gradient descent—as
though the platform could observe gradients u1appq at no additional cost. Here, we complete
the picture, and show that local experimentation in fact induces negligible excess cost as
we approach the mean-field limit. In general, a platform that randomizes payments around
pt will make lower profits than one that just pays everyone pt;
7 the result below, however,
shows that this excess cost decays quadratically in the magnitude of payment perturbations
ζ.
Theorem 9. Under the conditions of Theorem 6 there are constants C, α ą 0 such that
1
T
Tÿ
t“1
puAtpptq ´ uAtppt, ζtqq ď Cζ2 for all 0 ď ζ ă α. (4.8)
Recall that, as the market size gets large, Theorem 6 enables us to estimate gradients
of uappq in large-n markets using an amount of randomization that scales as n´α for some
0 ă α ă 0.5. Combined with Theorem 9, this result implies that we can in fact estimate
gradients of uappq “for free” via local experimentation when n is large, and that the regret
of a platform deploying our platform matches to first order the regret of an oracle who was
able to run first-order optimization on the mean-field limit.
4.4 Comparison with Rates for Global Experimentation
As discussed above, our local experimentation approach makes two departures from the
classical literature on experimental design under interference, including Aronow and Samii
[2017], Athey et al. [2018], Baird et al. [2018], Basse et al. [2019], Eckles et al. [2017], Hudgens
and Halloran [2008], Leung [2020], Manski [2013], Sobel [2006] and Tchetgen Tchetgen and
VanderWeele [2012]. First we use mean-field equilibrium modeling to capture and correct
7This is because randomization will not affect active supply size to first order, but suppliers randomized
to higher payments are more likely to be active. Randomization thus increases the average per-unit payment
the platform needs to suppliers without increasing the amount of demand the platform is able to serve.
22
for interference effects; second, we operationalize our approach in a dynamic setting where
a decision maker wants to tune a decision variable while controlling realized regret while
learning.
To highlight the value of mean-field equilibrium modeling, we compare our result from
Theorem 7 to what can be achieved via the global experimentation baseline that is tailored
to sequential decision making, but does not use equilibrium modeling: Each day t “ 1, ..., T ,
global experimentation chooses a payment pt given to all workers on that day, and the ob-
serves the corresponding reward Ut. Analogously to the random saturation design discussed
in Baird et al. [2018] and Hudgens and Halloran [2008], global experimentation does not
suffer any bias due to interference because there is no cross-day interference in our model.
The downside of global experimentation is that, unlike our equilibrium modeling based ap-
proach, it does not provide the analyst any direct information about gradients u1Atpptq, and
this severely limits the ability of global experimentation to effectively discover a good choice
of p.
To understand the limits of global experimentation we turn to the literature on continuous-
armed bandits (or zeroth-order optimization), which has established strong lower bounds for
closely related problems. Shamir [2013] considers the following setting: We have a sequential
decision making problem where, in each time period, the analyst gets to choose pt from a
bounded interval I and observes a reward Ut with E
“
Ut
ˇˇ
pt
‰ “ upptq and Var “Ut ˇˇ pt‰ “ 1;
the goal is to choose a sequence pt that makes the regret
řT
t“1pupp˚q ´ upptqq small, where
p˚ is the maximizer of up¨q over the interval I. Shamir [2013] then shows that, even if up¨q
is strongly concave, no algorithm can achieve expected regret that grows slower than
?
T ;
and, in fact, this result holds even if up¨q is known a priori to be a quadratic with unit
curvature. Further results in this line of work are given in Bubeck et al. [2017]. We also
note a closely related result of Keskin and Zeevi [2014] who establish a
?
T lower bound on
regret for pricing under a linear demand model (note that, with linear demand, the seller’s
profit is quadratic).
The upshot is that, when the daily reward functions uAtpptq are strongly concave and
there is meaningful cross-day noise due to At, our approach can achieve cumulative regret
on the order of logpT q (corresponding to a 1{t rate of decay in errors), whereas global
experimentation cannot improve over
?
T regret (corresponding to a 1{?t rate of decay
in errors). In other words, our ability to use mean-field modeling to leverage small-scale
payment variation within (rather than across) time periods enables us to fundamentally
alter the difficulty of the problem of learning the optimal p, and to improve our rate of
convergence in T .
Finally, we note that the well-known slow rates of convergence for continuous-armed
bandits have led some authors to studying a query model where we can evaluate the unknown
functions uAtp¨q twice rather than once; for example, Duchi et al. [2015] show that two
function evaluations can result in substantially faster rates of convergence than one. The
reason for this gain is that, given two function evaluations, the analyst directly cancel
out the main effect of the global noise term At. In our setting, it is implausible that
a platform could carry out such paired function evaluations in practice unless, e.g., they
simultaneously run experiments across two identical twin cities. But in this paper, we found
that—by leveraging structural information and mean-field modeling—local experimentation
can be used to obtain similar gains over zeroth-order optimization as one could get via twin
evaluation.
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5 Generalizations: Risk Aversion and Surge Pricing
So far, we have focused our discussion on a specific a model of a centralized market for
freelance labor: The platform chooses a distribution pi and then, for each supplier i, draws
Pi „ pi and promises to pay the supplier Pi per unit of demand served; the supplier computes
qAppiq, the expected number of units of demand they will get to serve if they join the
market; finally, each supplier compares their expected revenue PiqAppiq to their outside
option and chooses whether or not to join the marketplace. Our main results were that:
1) In large markets, we can unobstrusively estimate a marginal response function via local
experimentation; 2) The behavior of this marketplace can be characterized by a mean-
field limit; 3) In the mean-field limit, we can transform estimates of the marginal response
function into predictions of the effect of policy-relevant interventions. Thus, in large markets,
we can use local experimentation for optimizing platform choices.
As outlined in the introduction, however, we expect the general principles outlined here
to be more broadly applicable, beyond the model given above. While a full theory of
experimental design powered by mean-field equilibria is beyond the scope of this paper, in
this section we discuss two extensions of our model that are of considerable practical interest:
risk-averse suppliers and surge pricing. We define models for both problems below, and
write down balance conditions generalizing (3.6). Afterwards, we conjecture the existence
and form of a mean-field equilibrium, and show that the conjectured equilibrium model
lets us again map from consistent estimates of a marginal response function to relevant
counterfactual predictions—using the same recipe as deployed in the rest of this paper.
Example 10 (Risk Aversion). Under risk aversion, supplier utility functions may not scale
linearly with their revenue, and instead there is a concave function β such that the relevant
quantity for understanding the suppliers’ choices is the expectation of βprevenueq [Holt and
Laury, 2002, Pratt, 1978]. Suppose that βp0q “ 0, and that each worker can serve 0 or 1
units of demand.8 Then our balance condition (3.6) becomes
µpnqa ppiq “ Ppi
“
Zi “ 1
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ “ Epi ”fBi ´βpPiqqpnqa pµpnqa ppiqqq¯ ˇˇA “ aı . (5.1)
The curvature of the function βp¨q thus corresponds to the degree of a supplier’s risk aversion,
and setting βppq “ p recovers our original risk-neutral model.
Example 11 (Supply-Side Surge Pricing). Several prominent ride sharing platforms deploy
surge pricing where, in case of heavy demand, the platform applies a multiplier (generally
greater than 1) to the original payment in order to encourage higher supplier participation
[Cachon et al., 2017, Hall et al., 2015]. As a simple model, suppose that surge is triggered
automatically based on the supply-demand ratio, i.e., there is a function s : R` Ñ R`
such that, in each period, the i-th supplier gets paid spD{T qPi per unit of demand served.
Suppliers can anticipate surge and, as in the rest of the paper, they make decisions based on
limiting values of all random variables. Thus, suppliers anticipate payments spda{µappiqqPi,
resulting in a balance condition
µpnqa ppiq “ Ppi
“
Zi “ 1
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ “ Epi «fBi
˜
s
˜
da
µ
pnq
a ppiq
¸
Pi q
pnq
a pµpnqa ppiqqq
¸ ˇˇ
A “ a
ff
, (5.2)
where again spxq “ 1 recovers our original model.
8Generalizations to workers who can serve many units of demand are immediate, at the expense of more
involved notation.
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In both examples above, we conjecture that—in analogy to Lemma 4—a mean-field
limit exists and that it can be characterized by analogues of (5.1) and (5.2) but without
the n-superscripts. In this case, we can write both mean-field limits in a unified form via
generalized earning functions, θ : R2` Ñ R`, so that the asymptotic balance condition is
µappiq “ Ppi
“
Zi “ 1
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ “ Epi “fBi pθpPi, qapµappiqqqq ˇˇA “ a‰ . (5.3)
In the case of (5.1), we have θriskpp, qq “ βppqq. Meanwhile, for (5.2), recall that in
the mean-field limit the matching of supply and demand is characterized by the identity
qapµappiqq “ ωpda{µappiqq. Thus, our conjecture means that (5.2) converges to (5.3) with
generalized earning function θsurgepp, qq “ pqspω´1pqqq.
We close this section by carrying out “step 3” of the analysis outlined in the first para-
graph of this section, i.e., by showing how (5.3) lets us map from a marginal response
function to utility gradients with respect to surge; we leave verification of the conjectured
convergence to (5.3) for further work. To this end, fix a P A. First, it is not difficult to
show that the changes caused by the introduction of θp¨q affects the computation of utility
derivative u1appq only through the expression for µ1appq (cf. the proof of Proposition 12).
Hence, we here only focus on expressions for µ1appq.
Now, we can directly check that a reduced form expression as in (2.1) allows us to
estimate the following marginal response function via local randomization,
∆appq “ p∇θq1pp, qapµappqqqE
“
f 1B1pθpp, qapµappqqq
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ . (5.4)
where p∇θqip¨, ¨q denotes the ith coordinate of the gradient of θ. Meanwhile, an argument
based on the chain rule similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4 shows that
µ1appq “ ∆appq
Nˆ
1` p∇θq2pp, qapµappqqqp∇θq1pp, qapµappqqq ω
1
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
da
µ2appq ∆appq
˙
. (5.5)
Note, furthermore, that all quantities in (5.5) except ∆appq are either known a-priori or
can be estimated via observed averages. The upshot is that the mean-field equilibrium
characterized by (5.3) enables us to map an easy-to-estimate marginal response function
to µ1appq via (5.5). These estimates of µ1appq can then be directly used to compute utility
gradients u1appq that can be used for first-order optimization.
6 Simulation Results
We now consider a more comprehensive empirical evaluation of the performance of local ver-
sus global experimentation, building on in the simulation results of Section 2, and compare
mean performance of local experimentation and global experimentation across 1,000 simula-
tion replications. Local experimentation is run for 200 steps, exactly as described in Section
2, with a random initialization p1 „ Unifp10, 30q. Meanwhile, for global experimentation,
we consider a collection of strategies that first randomly draw payments pt „ Unifp10, 30q
for the first 1 ď t ď T time periods, fit a spline to the data (as in the left panel of Figure
4), and then deploy the learned policy for the remaining 200´T time periods. We consider
the choices T P t40, 60, 80, . . . , 200u. For both methods, we report both in-sample regret,
i.e., the mean utility shortfall relative to deploying the population-optimal p˚ for the T
learning periods, as well as future expected regret, i.e., the expected utility shortfall from
deploying the learned policy pˆ after the T learning periods. For local experimentation, we
25
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
in−sample mean regret
fu
tu
re
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
re
gr
et
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
local experimentation
global experimentation
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
in−sample mean regret
fu
tu
re
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
re
gr
et
l
l
l
l l
l
l l l
l
local experimentation
global experimentation
basic setting supply-side surge
Figure 6: Comparison of the regret of local and global experimentation in the setting of
Section 2, averaged across 1,000 simulation replications. The global experimentation path
is detailed in Section 6. In the right panel, the platform makes a public commitment to
multiply supply-side payments by a surge factor (6.1).
set pˆ “ 2řtt“1 t pt { pT pT ` 1qq following Corollary 8, whereas for global experimentation we
set pˆ to be the output of spline optimization discussed above.
As seen in the left panel of Figure 6, local experimentation outperforms global experimen-
tation by an order of magnitude along both metrics. Quantitatively, local experimentation
achieved mean in-sample regret of 0.025 and mean future regret of 0.0045. In contrast,
the best numbers achieved by global experimentation for these metrics were 0.57 and 0.12
respectively—and there was not a single choice of tuning parameters that achieved both. In
general, we see that a larger choice of T always improves future regret, whereas for in-sample
regret there is an optimal middle ground that balances exploration and exploitation (here,
T “ 80).
Next, we consider an analogous simulation design, but with supply-side surge pricing.
As discussed in Section 5, we assume that the platform makes a public commitment to
mechanistically increase supply side payments by a multiplicative factor spD{T q once the
demand D and supply T are realized, and suppliers take this commitment into account
when choosing whether or not to join the marketplace. Here, we use
spD{T q “ D
T
M
ω
ˆ
D
T
˙
, (6.1)
meaning that, by the properties of ωp¨q as outlined in Definition 5, the surge multiplier is
1 when D is small relative to T , but eventually climbs up to the ratio D{T as demand
outpaces supply. This choice of sp¨q is by no means optimal; it is simply an example.
As discussed in Section 5, our analysis of surge relies on a conjecture that relevant
properties of mean-field limits as discussed in Section 3.1 still hold with surge. We work
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with a limiting platform utility function that depends linearly on revenue minus costs as in
Lemma 3,
uappq “
ˆ
γ ´ ps
ˆ
da
µappq
˙˙
ω
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
µappq. (6.2)
As discussed above, we can estimate the p-derivative of the expected scaled active supply
size, µ1appq, by local experimentation via (5.4) and (5.5). Moreover, following the argument
of Theorem 6, we obtain p-derivatives of uappq via
uappq “
ˆ
γ ´ ps
ˆ
da
µappq
˙˙ˆ
´ω1
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
da
µappq ` ω
ˆ
da
µappq
˙˙
µ1appq
´ s
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
ω
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
µappq ` ps1
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
da
µappqω
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
µ1appq.
(6.3)
We turn this into a feasible estimator plugging in our local experimentation estimates of
µˆ1appq for µ1appq, and estimating the ratio da{µappq via its sample analogue D{T .
Results for learning p are given in the right panel of Figure 6. Qualitatively, the results
match those obtained without surge, and local experimentation still outperforms global
experimentation by an order of magnitude. Local experimentation achieved mean in-sample
regret of 0.013 and mean future regret of 0.0024, while the best corresponding numbers
achieved by global experimentation for these metrics were 0.63 and 0.29 respectively. We
also not that adding the automatic surge multiplier as in (6.1) decreased the optimal base
payment from 17.6 to 15.7, while increasing optimal mean platform utility by 0.06 (the
median utility difference is 0.04). Thus, in this example, the regret of global experimentation
is much larger than the utility gain from using surge as in (6.1) relative to not using surge—
whereas the regret of local experimentation is less than the effect of adopting surge.
Finally, we note that the global experimentation baseline considered here—namely our
two-phase algorithm that starts with pure exploration and then moves to pure exploitation—
is fairly simple, and it is possible that a more sophisticated global experimentation baseline
could somewhat improve performance. However one can check that, under reasonable con-
ditions and provided we explore for the first
?
T periods, our implemented baseline attains
the optimal
?
T regret rate of Shamir [2013] discussed in Section 4.4. Thus, more sophisti-
cated methods like Bayesian zeroth-order optimization9 as considered in, e.g., Letham et al.
[2018] may improve on finite sample performance but cannot improve on the overall regret
rate of our baselines.10
7 Discussion
We introduced a new framework for experimental design in stochastic systems with sig-
nificant cross-unit interference. The key insight is that, in certain families of models, the
inference is structured enough to be captured by a small number of key statistics, such as
9One potentially promising approach would be to use local experimentation to get gradient estimates
u1At pptq, and then incorporate these estimates into a Bayesian learning framework. It is plausible that this
could yield practically meaningfully improvements over the first-order approach considered in this paper.
10Another class of popular continuous-armed bandit algorithms were introduced by Flaxman et al. [2005]
and Kleinberg [2005]. These methods estimate derivatives by noisy function evaluations and then use these
for gradient descent. However, while desirable due to their transparency and ease, these methods suffer
cumulative regret on the order of T 3{4 in our setting. In our simulations, this class of methods performed
worse than the global experimentation baseline we report results for.
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the global demand-supply equilibrium, and the impact of interference can be subsequently
accounted for using mean-field asymptotics. We then proposed an approach based on lo-
cal experimentation that would allow us to accurately and efficiently estimate the utility
gradient in the large-system limit, and use these gradient estimates to perform first-order
optimization.
There are some simplifying assumptions we make in this work that can be relaxed or
verified in future research. For instance, we have assumed that the demand is exogenous.
We expect that an extension of our method can be used to capture scenarios where the
demand may, for instance, depend on the supply level: For example, a passenger may be
less likely to hail a ride if they know there would be a long wait. Another assumption we
made is that the market equilibrium can be reached relatively quickly. While there are
recent empirical evidence suggesting that drivers in a ride-sharing platform do respond to
payment changes in manner that takes into account the resulting market equilibrium [Hall
et al., 2019], it would be interesting to consider a more realistic model where prices may
be updated continuously before a new market equilibrium is fully reached. It is less clear
how the current model would apply in this setting, which is likely to require a substantially
more sophisticated analysis.
We believe that the general approach proposed in this paper, one that leverages stochas-
tic modeling and mean-field asymptotics in experimental design, has the potential to be
applicable in a wider range of problems. As one example, we may consider models in which
the key statistics that capture the interference patterns are multi-dimensional. This could
occur in a marketplace which, instead of being fully centralized, consists of a small number
of inter-connected sub-markets. For instance, in a ride-sharing platform, the sub-markets
may correspond to neighboring cities connected by highways and bridges. In these systems,
suppliers’ behaviors remain to be primarily influenced by the local supply-demand equi-
librium in their respective sub-markets. These local equilibria in turn interact with one
another due to network effects. Nevertheless, in a large-market regime where the numbers
of market participants are relatively large in all sub-markets, while the total number of sub-
markets remains the same, we may still use the type of mean-field asymptotics in this paper
to account for the interference across both individuals units and sub-markets to efficiently
estimate the effect of payment adjustments. In another direction, we may extend the one-
shot equilibrium model adopted in this paper to dynamic settings where the equilibrium
emerges gradually gradually according to a stochastic process (e.g., suppliers may adapt to
payment variations only over time), and study whether a dynamic version of our mean-field
model can be used to analysis the effects of local experimentation in these systems. Finally,
it would be interesting to investigate whether the local experimentation scheme proposed in
this paper can be generalized to estimate higher-order derivatives of the utility function.
8 Proof of Main Results
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Fix a P A. Recall that all suppliers know the realization of the global state, a, and the
probability that a given supplier will choose to become active is given by (3.6). Define
ψpnqa pµ, piq fi E
“
fB1
`
P1 E
“
Ω pD,Xq ˇˇA “ a‰˘ ˇˇA “ a‰ , X „ Binomialpn, µq. (8.1)
That is, ψ
pnq
a pµ, piq is the probability of a supplier becoming active under the payment
distribution pi, if they believe that the active supply size is Binomial pn, µq. Note that, since
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the same payment distribution applies uniformly across all suppliers, so are the probabilities
of the suppliers becoming active. As a result, for any pi, the actual active supply size T will
follow a Binomial distribution. In particular, this implies that T is an equilibrium active
supply size if and only if it is binomial with mean µ that satisfies the following fixed-point
equation:
ψpnqa pµ, piq “ µ. (8.2)
It suffices to show that (8.2) admits a unique solution in the domain µ P r0, 1s. Because
fbp¨q is by construction non-decreasing, it follows that ψpnqa pµ, piq is a continuous function and
non-increasing in µ: A supplier is more discouraged from becoming active, if they believe
there will be more active suppliers in the market eventually. In particular, the left-hand side
of (8.2), ψ
pnq
a pµ, piq, is a non-negative, continuous and non-increasing function over µ P r0, 1s,
which implies that (8.2) admits a unique solution in r0, 1s.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Our argument will leverage the following simple expression for the limiting derivative of qp¨q,
the proof of which follows immediately from a generalization of a classical result of Stein
[1981] to exponential families; the proof is given in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 10. Fix a P A and µ ą 0. Then, ddµqpnqa pµq is non-positive, and
lim
nÑ8
d
dµ
qpnqa pµq “ ddµω pda{µq “ ´ω
1pda{µqda
µ2
. (8.3)
The claim in (3.14) follows directly from the definition of Ω and Assumption 1, i.e.,
that Ωpd, tq converges to ωpd{tq as t Ñ 8, and the fact that conditional on A “ a, D{n
concentrates on da as n Ñ 8. For (3.13), recall that µpnqa ppq is the solution to the balance
equation in (8.2): µ “ E
”
fB1pp qpnqa pµqq
ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
. By (3.14), and the monotonicity of the
functions fbp¨q and ωp¨q, we have that µpnqa ppq converges to µappq as n Ñ 8, where µappq
is the solution to the limiting balance equation given in the statement of Lemma 2. The
claim in (3.15) follows from (3.13), (3.14) and Assumption 3. The convergence of q
pnq1
a pµq
in (3.16) follows from Proposition 10.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 4
We start by verifying (3.18). By (8.2) and the chain rule, we have that
d
dp
µpnqa ppq “ ddpψpµ
pnq
a , δpq
“ d
dp
E
”
fB1
´
pqpnqa pµpnqa ppqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
“E
”
f 1B1
´
pqpnqa pµpnqa ppqq
¯´
qpnqa pµpnqa ppqq ` ppqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqqpµpnqa q1ppq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
“qpnqa pµpnqa ppqqE
”
f 1B1ppqpnqa pµpnqa ppqqq
ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
` ppqpnqa q1pµappqqpµpnqa q1ppqE
”
f 1B1ppqpnqa pµpnqa ppqqq
ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
“∆pnqa ppq ` p∆pnqa ppqpqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqqpµpnqa q1ppq{qpnqa pµpnqa ppqq.
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The last expression above is linear in pµpnqa q1ppq. Re-arranging the equation and solving for
pµpnqa q1ppq leads to the desired result. Finally, (3.19) is a direct consequence of Lemma 2,
while (3.20) follows by combining from (3.18) with (3.19) and Lemma 2.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 6
The proof will make use of the following two technical results. The first concerns the
sensitivity of the system dynamics with respect to small perturbations ζ, and the second
extends calculations from Section 3.1 to the utility function u
pnq
a ppq. The proofs of these
results are given in Appendices A.4 and A.5, respectively. Recall that µ
pnq
a pp, ζq is the
expected fraction of active suppliers in equilibrium when the payments are ζ-perturbed
from p, i.e., µ
pnq
a pp, ζq fi E “T pp, ζq{n ˇˇA “ a‰.
Proposition 11. Fix p ą 0, a P A and n P N. µpnqa pp, ζq and qpnqa pp, ζq are twice differen-
tiable functions with respect to ζ, and satisfy:
1.
!
B
Bζµ
pnq
a pp, ζq
)
ζ“0
“
!
B
Bζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq
)
ζ“0
“ 0 for all n P N.
2. There exists α ą 0 such that
!
B2
B2ζµ
pnq
a pp, ζq
)
ζ“ζ0
and
!
B2
Bζ2 q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq
)
ζ“ζ0
are
bounded uniformly over all ζ0 P p0, αq and n P N.
Proposition 12. Fix p ą 0 and a P A. We have that
lim
nÑ8
d
dp
ua
pnqppq “u1appq
“µ1appq
„
r
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
´ pω
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
´
ˆ
r1
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
´ pω1
ˆ
da
µappq
˙˙
da
µappq

´ ω
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
µappq,
where uap¨q is defined in (3.15).
Now, recall that we are considering the case where the platform employs an η-perturbed
payment distribution pip,η, with Pi “ p` ηεi ((3.11)). Define the estimators
sD “D{n, sZ “ T {n “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
Zi, (8.4)
p∆ “ζ´1n yCov rZi, εis LyVar rεis, (8.5)
so that sD and sZ correspond to the scaled demand and active suppliers, respectively, and p∆
is the scaled regression coefficient of Zi on εi. Finally, define the estimator
pΥ “ p∆{˜1` p sD p∆ω1 ` sD{ sZ˘sZ2ω ` sD{ sZ˘
¸
. (8.6)
Our main remaining task is to show that, under the stated conditions,sD Ñda, sZ Ñ µappq, p∆ Ñ ∆appq, and pΥ Ñ µ1appq, (8.7)
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in L2 as nÑ8, for any a P A. In light of Proposition 12, the desired conclusion (4.4) then
follows immediately by combining (4.3) with (8.7) with (8.4) and invoking Slutsky’s lemma.
We now turn to proving (8.7). First, we note that the fact that pΥ Ñ µ1appq follows
directly by combining the first three convergence claims in (8.7) with Lemma 4. The fact
that sZ Ñ da follows from our definition (3.1). For sZ Ñ µappq, note that by Chernoff bound
we know that sZ concentrates on µpnqa pp, ζnq as nÑ8. Furthermore, we have that
lim
nÑ8µ
pnq
a pp, ζnq “ lim
nÑ8µ
pnq
a ppq ` lim
nÑ8
´
µpnqa pp, ζnq ´ µpnqa ppq
¯
paq“µappq ` lim
nÑ8
´
µpnqa pp, ζnq ´ µpnqa ppq
¯
pbq“µappq, (8.8)
where steps paq and pbq follow from Lemma 2 and Proposition 11, respectively. Together,
this shows that sZ Ñ ppq in L2.
Finally, it remains to show that p∆ Ñ ∆appq. To this end, we first observe the following
fact: There exists a constant C ą 0 such that, for every ζ and n∣∣∣∣1ζ Covn “Zi, εi ˇˇA “ a‰´∆pnqa ppq
∣∣∣∣ ď ζC. (8.9)
To prove (8.9), note that given ζ-perturbed payments Pi “ p` ζ εi, we have
Covn
“
Zi, εi
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ “ En ”εifBi ´pp` ζεiq qpnqa ´µpnqa pp, ζq¯q¯ ˇˇA “ aı .
We can then take the limit ζ Ñ 0, and verify that there exists C ą 0 such that∣∣∣∣En „1ζ εifBi ´pp` ζεiq qpnqa ´µpnqa pp, ζq¯q¯ ˇˇA “ a

´qpnqa pp, 0qEn
”
f 1Bippqpnqa pµpnqa pp, 0qqq
ˇˇ
A “ a
ı∣∣∣ ď ζC
Here, we used Proposition 11, and specifically the fact that
!
B
Bζ q
pnq
a
´
µ
pnq
a pp, ζq
¯)
ζ“0
“ 0,
both fBip¨q and qpnqa pµpnqa pp, ¨qq are twice differentiable with bounded second derivatives
uniformly over n, and εi has variance 1. Finally, by Slutsky’s lemma and conditionally on
A “ a, we have p∆´ Covn “Zi, ζnεi ˇˇA “ a‰
Varn
“
ζnεi
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ Ñp 0.
As Varn
“
εi
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ “ 1, we conclude that p∆ Ñp ∆appq using (8.9) and Lemma 4.
8.5 Proof of Theorem 7
Given the form of (4.5), we can use Lemma 1 of Orabona et al. [2015] to check that
Tÿ
t“1
tpp´ ptqpΓt ď 1
2η
Tÿ
t“1
tpp´ ptq2 ` η
2
Tÿ
t“1
pΓ2t . (8.10)
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We then can replace the gradient estimates pΓt with their mean-field limits u1Atpptq provided
we add appropriate error terms as follows,
Tÿ
t“1
tpp´ ptqu1Atpptq ď
1
2η
Tÿ
t“1
tpp´ ptq2 ` η
2
Tÿ
t“1
u1Atpptq2
`
Tÿ
t“1
tpp´ ptq
´
u1Atpptq ´ pΓt¯` η2
Tÿ
t“1
´pΓ2t ´ u1Atpptq2¯ .
Then, given the result in Theorem 6 we see that, for any ε ą 0,
Tÿ
t“1
tpp´ ptqu1Atpptq ď
1
2η
Tÿ
t“1
tpp´ ptq2 ` η
2
Tÿ
t“1
u1Atpptq2 ` ε (8.11)
with probability tending to 1 as n gets large. Noting that
∣∣u1Atpptq∣∣ ăM , this simplifies to
Tÿ
t“1
tpp´ ptqu1Atpptq ď
1
2η
Tÿ
t“1
tpp´ ptq2 ` ηM
2T
2
(8.12)
with probability tending to 1. The desired statement (4.6) follows by leveraging the remain-
ing assumptions from the theorem statement: σ-strong concavity of uAtp¨q implies that
uAtppq ď uAtpptq ` pp´ ptqu1Atpptq ´
σ
2
pp´ ptq2, (8.13)
and we use the above to replace the left-hand side expression of (8.12) while noting that
σ ą η´1.
8.6 Proof of Corollary 8
Let p˚ be the maximizer of up¨q over I “ rc´, c`s. By (4.6) we have
lim
nÑ8P
«
1
T
Tÿ
t“1
t pupp˚q ´ upptqq ď ZT
T
` ηM
2
2
ff
“ 1,
ZT “
Tÿ
t“1
t pupp˚q ´ upptq ` uAtpp˚q ´ uAtpptqq .
(8.14)
Paired with strong concavity of uppq around p˚ and the fact that u1pp˚q “ 0, this implies
lim
nÑ8P
«
σ
2
1
T
Tÿ
t“1
tpp˚ ´ ptq2 ď ZT
T
` ηM
2
2
ff
“ 1. (8.15)
In order to verify the desired result, our next step is to bound ZT . First, because pt is
chosen before we get to learn about At, Zt is a martingale. Second, because the derivative
of uappq is uniformly bounded by M , we have |Zt ´ Zt´1| ď 2Mt |pt ´ p˚| for all t. Thus,
using Hoeffding’s lemma to bound the moment-generating function of a bounded random
variable, these two facts together imply that
E
”
exp pcpZt ´ Zt´1qq
ˇˇ
pt, tZs, psut´1s“1
ı
ď exp
ˆ
1
2
c2M2t2 ppt ´ p˚q2
˙
,
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and so
Yt “ exp
˜
cZt ´ 1
2
c2M2
tÿ
s“1
s2 pps ´ p˚q2
¸
is a super-martingale for any c ą 0. Thus, by Markov’s inequality,
P
«
ZT ě cM
2
2
tÿ
t“1
t2 ppt ´ p˚q2 ` ´ logpδq
c
ff
ď δ. (8.16)
for any 0 ă δ ă 1. Pairing (8.15) and (8.16) with c “ σ{p2M2T q then yields (recall that
η ą σ´1)
lim sup
nÑ8
P
«
σ
4
1
T
Tÿ
t“1
tpp˚ ´ ptq2 ď ηM2
`
2 log
`
δ´1
˘` 1{2˘ff ě 1´ δ. (8.17)
Finally, the desired result follows by noting that
T 2
2
pp˚ ´ p¯T q2 ď
Tÿ
t“1
tpp˚ ´ p¯T q2 ď
Tÿ
t“1
tpp˚ ´ ptq2.
8.7 Proof of Theorem 9
Using Proposition 11 and a first-order Taylor expansion with a Lagrange-form remainder,
we immediately see that there is a C ą 0 such that, for all n ě n0 and 0 ď ζ ă α,
Tÿ
t“1
´
u
pnq
At
pptq ´ upnqAt ppt, ζq
¯
ď CTζ2.
Since this bound holds for all n ě n0, it also holds in the limit nÑ8, thus implying (4.8).
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Fix a P A. It follows from Lemma 2 that
uappq “ γµappqqapµappqq ´ pµappqωpda{pq “ pγ ´ pqµappqqapµappqq, (A.1)
where
qapµq “ ωpda{µq. (A.2)
We have that
u2appq “ pγ ´ pq d
2
dp2
pqapµappqqµappqq ´ 2 d
dp
pqapµappqqµappqq . (A.3)
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Note that qapµappqqµappq is the normalized amount of demand that ends up being served.
The next result shows that qapµappqqµappq is non-decreasing in the payment p; The proof is
given in Appendix A.6.
Proposition 13. There exists c ą 0, such that
d
dp
pqapµappqqµappqq ě c, for all p P pc0, γq. (A.4)
Because p ă γ, in light of Proposition 13, in order to show that uap¨q is strictly concave,
it suffices to demonstrate that
d2
dp2
pqapµappqqµappqq ď 0. (A.5)
To this end, we have that
d2
dp2
pqapµappqqµappqq
“µ2appq
`
µappqq1 pµappqq ` qapµappqq
˘` µ1appq2 `µappqq2pµappqq ` 2q1apµappqq˘
paq“µ2appq
`
µappqq1 pµappqq ` qapµappqq
˘` µ1appq2 d2aω2pda{µappqqµappq3
pbq“µ2appq
ˆ
ωpda{µappqq ´ ω1pda{µappqq da
µappq
˙
` µ1appq2 d
2
aω
2pda{µappqq
µappq3 (A.6)
where steps paq and pbq follow from the fact that qapµq “ ωpda{µq. Because ωp¨q is concave,
it follows that the second term in (A.6) is non-positive. Furthermore, recall from Definition
5 that ωp¨q is concave and ωp0q “ 0. By Proposition 5, we have that
ωpda{µappqq ´ ω1pda{µappqq da
µappq ě 0. (A.7)
In the remainder of the proof, we will focus on showing that
µ2appq ď 0, (A.8)
which would imply the strong concavity of uap¨q.
Recall that, by construction, the average choice function fap¨q is non-decreasing and
concave. Recall from (8.2) that µappq satisfies the fixed-point equation:
µappq “ ψapµappq, pq (A.9)
where
ψapµ, pq “ fappqapµqq. (A.10)
Twice-differentiating (A.9) with respect to p, we obtain that
µ2appq “
" B
Bµψapµ, pq
*
µ“µappq
µ2appq ` pµ1appq, 1qHψapµappq, pqpµ1appq, 1qᵀ, (A.11)
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where Hψap¨, ¨q denotes the Hessian of ψap¨q. This leads to
µ2appq “
˜
1´
" B
Bµψapµ, pq
*
µ“µappq
¸´1
pµ1appq, 1qHψapµappq, pqpµ1appq, 1qᵀ. (A.12)
Note that since f and q are non-increasing, we have that
!
B
Bµψapµ, pq
)
µ“µappq
ď 0. It
remains to verify that
pµ1appq, 1qHψapµappq, pqpµ1appq, 1qᵀ ď 0. (A.13)
Recall that ψapµ, pq “ fappqapµqq. We have that
B2
Bµ2ψapµ, pq “f
2
a ppqapµqqppq1apµqq2 ` f 1appqapµqqpq2apµq,
B2
Bp2ψapµ, pq “f
2
a ppqapµqqqapµq2
B2
BpBµψapµ, pq “f
2
a ppqapµqqpq1apµqqapµq ` f 1appqapµqqq1apµq. (A.14)
Rearranging terms, and using the fact that qapµq “ ωpda{µq, we can decompose Hψapµ, pq
as follows:
Hψapµ, pq “ f2a ppqapµqqA` f
1
appqapµqqω2pda{µqd2a
µ4
B` f
1
appqapµqqω1pda{µqda
µ2
C (A.15)
where
A “ppq1apµq, qapµqq b ppq1apµq, qapµqq,
B “
„
1 0
0 0

, C “
„ 2p
µ ´1
´1 0

.
We make the following observations concerning the three terms in (A.15). For the first term,
A is the outer product of ppq1apµq, qapµqq with itself and is hence positive semi-definite. Since
fap¨q is concave and hence f2a p¨q ă 0, we have that f2a ppqapµqqA is negative semi-definite,
i.e.,
f2a ppqapµqqA ĺ 0. (A.16)
For the second term, note that f 1appqapµqq ą 0 and ω2p¨q ă 0 due to the concavity of ωp¨q.
Therefore, we have that
f 1appqapµqqω2pda{µqd2a
µ4
B ĺ 0. (A.17)
For the third term, since we are only interested in the properties of C along the specific
direction pµ1appq, 1q, it suffices to show that when µ “ µappq, pµ1appq, 1qCpµ1appq, 1qᵀ is non-
positive. This claim is isolated in the form of the following proposition; The proof is given
in Appendix A.7.
Proposition 14.
pµ1appq, 1qCpµ1appq, 1qᵀ ď 0. (A.18)
By combining (A.16), (A.17) and Proposition 14, we have proven (A.13), i.e.,
pµ1appq, 1qHψapµappq, pqpµ1appq, 1qᵀ ď 0. (A.19)
This in turn proves Lemma 3.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
We have that
gpxq “gp0q `
ż x
0
g1psqds paqě
ż x
0
g1pxqds pbqě xg1pxq, (A.20)
where paq follows from the assumption that gp0q ě 0, and pbq from the concavity of gp¨q,
which implies that g1p¨q is non-increasing over x ą 0. For the second statement, we first
note that if, for some c ą 0,
g1pxq ě c 2
x
g
´x
2
¯
, (A.21)
then we have that
gpxq “ g
´x
2
¯
`
ż x
x{2
g1psq ds ě g
´x
2
¯
` x
2
g1pxq ě p1` cq g
´x
2
¯
.
We then conclude by arguing by contraction. Suppose that, for each M ě 0, there exists
some x ě M satisfying (A.21); then, by the above argument and noting that gpxq is non-
negative and concave (and thus non-decreasing), we must either have gpxq “ 0 for all x, or
limxÑ8 gpxq “ 8. Thus, under our stated assumptions, the condition (A.21) can only hold
on a finite interval for any value of c ą 0, and so
lim sup
xÑ8
xg1pxq
gpxq ď lim supxÑ8 2
px{2qg1pxq
gpx{2q “ 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 10
We start by verifying a useful property that applies to any exponential family with discrete
support.
Definition 12. Let tXu a family of discrete random variables and parameterized by θ P
Θ Ă R. We say that tXu is an exponential family, if the probability mass function (PMF)
fθ for X can be expressed as
fθpxq “ hpxq exppηpθqT pxq ´Apθqq, x P Z. (A.22)
where T p¨q is referred to as the sufficient statistic, and ηpθq the natural parameter.
We have the following identity, which is a simple generalization of a result proved by
Stein [1981] for Gaussian random variables.
Lemma 15. Fix an exponential family of random variables X with discrete support X
parametrized by θ P Θ defined over a finite subset of R, with sufficient statistic T pXq and
natural parameter ηpθq. Then, for any function g : X Ñ R, we have that
d
dθ
Eθ rgpXqs “ Covθ rgpXq, T pXqs , (A.23)
for all θ in the interior of Θ.
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Proof. First, observe that
ř
x fθpxq “ hpxq exppηpθqT pxq ´ Apθqq “ 1. Taking deriva-
tives on both sides with respect to θ, we obtain that
0 “
ÿ
x
hpxq `T pxqη1pθq ´A1pθq˘ pexppηpθqT pxq ´Apθqq
“Eθ rT pXqs η1pθq ´A1pθq (A.24)
which implies that
Eθ rT pXqs “ A1pθq{η1pθq. (A.25)
We have that
d
dθ
Eθ rgpXqs “
ÿ
xPX
gpxq BBθ fθpxq
“
ÿ
xPX
gpxq `T pxqη1pθq ´A1pθq˘hpxq exp pηpθqT pxq ´Apθqq
“η1pθqEθ
“
gpXq `T pXq ´A1pθq{η1pθq˘‰
paq“η1pθqEθ rgpXq pT pXq ´ Eθ rT pXqsqs
pbq“η1pθqEθ rpgpXq ´ E rgpXqsq pT pXq ´ E rT pXqsqs
“Covθ rgpXq, T pXqs , (A.26)
where paq follows from (A.25), and pbq from the fact that Eθ rT pXq ´ Eθ rT pXqss “ 0. This
proves Lemma 15.
We are now ready to prove the stated result. We will assume that all probabilities are
calculated by conditioning on A “ a, and thus omit it from our notation. The fact that
d
dµq
pnq
a pµq is non-positive follows directly from the fact that Ωpd, tq is non-increasing in t
(Assumption 1). The PMF of an pn, µq Binomial random variable X can be written as
fµpxq “
ˆ
n
x
˙
exp
ˆ
x log
ˆ
µ
1´ µ
˙
` n logpµp1´ µqq
˙
. (A.27)
In particular, the set of Binomial random variables forms an exponential family, with natural
parameter ηpµq “ log
´
µ
1´µ
¯
and sufficient statistic T pXq “ X. We now employ Lemma 15
above. Define
H fi X ´ Eµ rXs “ X ´ nµ. (A.28)
For a fixed d, we have that11
d
dµ
Eµ rΩpd,Xqs pη1pµqq´1 paq“ Covµ rΩpd,Xq, Xs
“Eµ rΩpd,XqHs
pbq“Eµ rωpd{XqHs ` Eµ rlpd,XqHs
pcqP Eµ rωpd{XqHs ˘
b
Eµ rlpd,Xq2sE rH2s
“Covµ rωpd{Xq, Xs ˘
b
Eµ rlpd,Xq2sE rH2s (A.29)
11The notation x P a˘ b denotes x P ra´ b, a` bs.
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where paq follows from Lemma 15, pbq from Assumption 1, and pcq from the CauchySchwarz
inequality. Taking expectation with respect to d „ D on both sides, we obtain
d
dµ
Eµ rΩpD,Xqs pη1pµqq´1 P Eµ rωpD{Xqs ˘
b
Eµ rlpD,Xq2sE rH2s. (A.30)
We next bound each of the two terms in (A.30). For the second term, recall that lp¨q is
bounded and |lpd, tq| “ op1{?d ` 1{?tq (Assumption 1). Furthermore, it follows from the
Chernoff bound and (3.2), respectively, that
Pµ rX ě nµ{2s , P rD ě nda{2s “ op1{nq as nÑ8. (A.31)
This implies that
Eµ
“
lpD,Xq2‰ “ op1{nq, as nÑ8. (A.32)
Furthermore, note that
Eµ
“
H2
‰ “ Varµ rXs “ Opnq. (A.33)
Combining the above two equations, we conclude thatb
Eµ rlpD,Xq2sE rH2s “ op1q, as nÑ8. (A.34)
Next, we turn to the first term in (A.30), which will follow from the following result. Fix
δ P p0, µq, and define the event
E “ t|H{n| ă δu. (A.35)
Using Taylor expansion on the function
hpxq fi ω
ˆ
d{n
µ` x
˙
(A.36)
and the smoothness of ω, we have that there exists a constant c1 ą 0 such that, for all n
and d,
hpxq P hp0q ` h1p0qx˘ c1x2, @x P r´δ, δs. (A.37)
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Fix d P R`. We have that
Eµ rω pd{XqHs “Eµ
„
ω
ˆ
d{n
pnµ`Hq{n
˙
H

“Eµ rhpH{nqHs
“Eµ r1EhpH{nqHs ` Eµ r1EhpH{nqHs
paqP Eµ r1EhpH{nqHs ˘ c2
b
PpEqEµ rH2s
pbqP Eµ r1EhpH{nqHs ˘ op1q
pcqP Eµ
„ˆ
hp0q ` h1p0qH
n
˙
H

˘ c1Eµ
„
H2
n2
H

˘ c2PpEq ˘ op1q
PEµ
„ˆ
hp0q ` h1p0qH
n
˙
H

˘ c1Eµ
„
H2
n2
H

˘ op1q
pdqP Eµ
„ˆ
hp0q ` h1p0qH
n
˙
H

˘Op1{nq ˘ op1q
peqP d
dµ
ω
ˆ
d{n
µ
˙
Eµ
“
H2
‰˘ op1q
“ d
dµ
ω
ˆ
d{n
µ
˙
µpnqa p1´ µq ˘ op1q
“ d
dµ
ω
ˆ
d{n
µ
˙
pη1pµqq´1 ˘ op1q (A.38)
where c2 “ maxd,xPR` Ωpd, xq, and c3 “ maxxPr´δ,δs hpxq, and the op1q term does not de-
pend on d. Step paq is based on the CauchySchwarz inequality, pbq from the fact that P `E˘
converges to 0 exponentially fast in n by the Chernoff bound and that E
“
H2
‰ “ Opnq, pcq
from the Taylor expansion in (A.37), and pdq from the fact that ∣∣E “H3‰∣∣ “ Opnq as a result
of X being a Binomial random variable. Finally, step peq follows from the definition of h in
(A.36).
Recall from (3.1) that, conditional on A “ a, D{n concentrates on da as nÑ8. (A.38)
thus implies that
lim
nÑ8Eµ rω pD{XqHs “ limnÑ8
ÿ
dPZ`
Eµ rω pd{XqHsP rD “ d|A “ as
“ d
dµ
ω pda{µq pη1pµqq´1 (A.39)
Substituting (A.34) and (A.39) into (A.30), we obtain that
lim
nÑ8
d
dµ
Eµ rΩ pD,Xq |A “ as “ d
dµ
ω pda{µq . (A.40)
This proves Proposition 10.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 11
Fix a P A and n P N. Denote by pip,ζ the ζ-perturbed payment distribution centered at p
(3.11). We first prove that
!
B
Bζµ
pnq
a pp, ζq
)
ζ“0
“ 0. By (8.2), µpnqa pp, ζq satisfies
Bk
Bkζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq “ B
k
Bkζ ψ
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζq, pip,ζq, k P N. (A.41)
It therefore suffices to evaluate the right-hand side of the above equation. To this end:
ψpnqa pµpnqa pp, ζq, pip,ζq ´ ψpnqa pµpnqa ppq, δpq
paq“ 1
2
´
E
”
fB1
´
pp` ζq qpnqa pµpnqa pp, ζqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
` E
”
fB1
´
pp´ ζq qpnqa pµpnqa pp, ζqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı¯
´ E
”
fB1
´
p qpnqa pµpnqa ppqqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
“1
2
´
E
”
fB1
´
pp` ζq qpnqa pµpnqa pp, ζqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
´ E
”
fB1
´
p qpnqa pµpnqa ppqqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı¯
` 1
2
´
E
”
fB1
´
pp´ ζq qpnqa pµpnqa pp, ζqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
´ E
”
fB1
´
p qpnqa pµpnqa ppqqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı¯
,
(A.42)
where paq follows from the definition of ζ-perturbation ((3.11)) and the independence of
perturbations tεiuiPN from the rest of the system. Since both fB1p¨q and qpnqa p¨q are bounded,
for the first term on the right-hand side of (A.42), it is not difficult to show using the
dominated convergence theorem that there exists c ą 0 such that12
E
”
fB1
´
pp` ζq qpnqa pµpnqa pp, ζqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
´ E
”
fB1
´
p qpnqa pµpnqa ppqqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı
Pυζ ˘ cζ2, (A.43)
for all sufficiently small ζ, where υ fi
!
B
BζE
”
fB1
´
pp` ζq qpnqa pµpnqa pp, ζqq
¯ ˇˇ
A “ a
ı)
ζ“0
.
Applying the same argument to the second term in (A.42), we have that there exists c, such
that for all sufficiently small ζ
ψ
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζq, ζq ´ ψpnqa pµpnqa pp, 0q, 0q
ζ
P ˘cζ
2
ζ
“ ˘cζ, (A.44)
which further implies that " B
Bζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq
*
ζ“0
“ 0. (A.45)
For the derivative of q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ¨qq, note that by chain rule, we have
B
Bζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq “ pqpnqa q1pµpnqa pp, ζqq BBζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq. (A.46)
Since
!
B
Bζµ
pnq
a pp, ζq
)
ζ“0
“ 0 by (A.45), and pqpnqa q1pµpnqa pp, ζqq is finite by Proposition 10, we
have that
!
B
Bζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqqq
)
ζ“0
“ 0. This proves the first claim of Proposition 11.
12Notation: x P y ˘ z Ø x P ry ´ z, y ` zs.
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For the second claim, define
gε1pζq fi pp` ε1ζq qpnqa
´
µpnqa pp, ζq
¯
. (A.47)
Applying the chain rule to (A.41), we have that
B2
B2ζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq “E
„ B2
B2ζ fB1 pgε1pζqq
ˇˇ
A “ a

“E “f2B1pgε1pζqqg1ε1pζq2 ` f 1B1pgε1pζqqg2ε1pζq ˇˇA “ a‰ (A.48)
Note that
g1ε1pζq “
B
Bζ
”
pp` εζqqpnqa pµpnqa pp, ζqq
ı
“p BBζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq ` ε1qpnqa pµpnqa pp, ζqq ` ε1ζ BBζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq, (A.49)
and
g2ε1pζq “ p
B2
B2ζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq ` 2ε1 BBζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq ` ε1ζ B
2
B2ζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq. (A.50)
By chain rule, we have" B2
B2ζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqqq
*
ζ“0
“pqpnqa q2pµpnqa pp, 0qq
" B
Bζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq
*2
ζ“0
` pqpnqa q1pµpnqa pp, 0qq
" B2
B2ζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq
*
ζ“0
“pqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqq
" B2
B2ζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq
*
ζ“0
, (A.51)
where the last step follows from the fact that
!
B
Bζµ
pnq
a pp, ζq
)
ζ“0
“ 0. Applying (A.46) and
(A.51) to (A.49) and (A.50), we have
g1ε1p0q “ p
" B
Bζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq
*
ζ“0
` ε1qpnqa pµpnqa pp, 0qq ` 0 “ ε1qpnqa pµpnqa ppqq, (A.52)
and
g2ε1p0q “p
" B2
B2ζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq
*
ζ“0
` 2ε1
" B
Bζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq
*
ζ“0
` 0
“ppqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqq
" B2
B2ζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq
*
ζ“0
. (A.53)
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Substituting the expressions for g1ε1p0q and g2ε1p0q into (A.48), we obtain:" B2
B2ζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq
*
ζ“0
“E
«
f2B1pgε1p0qqε21qpnqa pµpnqa ppqq2 ` f 1B1pgε1p0qqppqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqq
" B2
B2ζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq
*
ζ“0
ˇˇ
A “ a
ff
“E “f2B1pgε1p0qq ˇˇA “ a‰ qpnqa pµpnqa ppqq2
` E “f 1B1pgε1p0qq ˇˇA “ a‰ ppqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqq" B2B2ζ µpnqa pp, ζq
*
ζ“0
, (A.54)
where the last step follows from the fact that ε1 P t´1, 1u and hence ε21 “ 1. After re-
arrangement, the above equation yields" B2
B2ζ µ
pnq
a pp, ζq
*
ζ“0
“ E
“
f2B1pgε1p0qq
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ qpnqa pµpnqa ppqq2
1´ E “f 1B1pgε1p0qq ˇˇA “ a‰ pqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqqp , (A.55)
and by (A.51), we have" B2
B2ζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζq, ζqq
*
ζ“0
“pqpnqa q1pµpnqa pp, 0qq
" B2
B2ζ µ
pnq
a pp, 0q
*
ζ“0
“pqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqq
˜
E
“
f2B1pgε1p0qq
ˇˇ
A “ a‰ qpnqa pµpnqa ppqq2
1´ E “f 1B1pgε1p0qq ˇˇA “ a‰ pqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqqp
¸
. (A.56)
Finally, we check the uniform boundedness of the second derivatives with respect to all n and
all sufficiently small ζ. To show that
!
B2
B2ζµ
pnq
a pp, ζq
)
ζ“0
, note that f 1B1p¨q is non-negative and
pqpnqa q1p¨q non-positive (Proposition 10). Therefore, the term E “f 1B1pgε1p0qq ˇˇA “ a‰ pqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqqp
is non-positive. By (A.55), this implies the uniform boundedness of B
2
B2ζµ
pnq
a pp, ζq. Note that
by Proposition 10, pqpnqa q1pµpnqa ppqq is non-positive and bounded, and with (A.56) this shows
that B
2
B2ζ q
pnq
a pµpnqa pp, ζqq is bounded for all n and all sufficiently small ζ. This proves the
second claim and thus completes the proof of Proposition 11.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 12
Fix a P A and n P N. Consider the case where the payment distributions where all potential
suppliers are offered a fixed payment, p, i.e., pi “ δp. Recall from (3.8) and (3.10) that
d
dp
upnqa ppq “ ddp
1
n
E
«
RpD, T q ´
nÿ
i“1
PiZiSi
ˇˇˇ
A “ a
ff
“ d
dp
E
„
1
n
RpD, T q
ˇˇˇ
A “ a

´ d
dp
˜
1
n
pE
«
nÿ
i“1
ZiSi
ff ˇˇˇ
A “ a
¸
“ d
dp
E
„
1
n
RpD, T q
ˇˇˇ
A “ a

´ d
dp
ˆ
pE
„
1
n
ΩpD, T qT
 ˇˇˇ
A “ a
˙
, (A.57)
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where T „ Binomialpµpnqa ppq, nq. We have by the chain rule:
d
dp
E rRpD, T qs “E
«
pµpnqa q1ppq
"
d
dµ
Eµ
“
RpD, Xq ˇˇA “ a‰*
µ“µpnqa ppq
ff
(A.58)
where X „ Binomialpµ, nq, and similarly
d
dp
E rΩpD, T qT s “ E
«
pµpnqa q1ppq
"
d
dµ
Eµ
“
ΩpD, XqT ˇˇA “ a‰*
µ“µpnqa ppq
ff
. (A.59)
Using arguments essentially identical to that of Proposition 10, we can show that for all
a P A and µ ą 0
lim
nÑ8
d
dµ
Eµ
„
1
n
RpD, Xq ˇˇA “ a “ d
dµ
prpda{µqµq (A.60)
lim
nÑ8
d
dµ
Eµ
„
1
n
ΩpD, XqX ˇˇA “ a “ d
dµ
pωpda{µqµq , (A.61)
where the limiting functions ω and r are defined in Assumptions 3 and 1, respectively.
Substituting (A.60) and (A.61) into (A.58) and (A.59), respectively, and observing that
lim
nÑ8E
“
ΩpD,T qT {n ˇˇA “ a‰ “ ωpda{µappqqµappq, (A.62)
we have
lim
nÑ8
d
dp
E
„
1
n
RpD, T q
ˇˇˇ
A “ a

“ µ1appq
"
d
dµ
prpda{µqµq
*
µ“µappq
,
lim
nÑ8
d
dp
ˆ
pE
„
1
n
ΩpD, T qT
ˇˇˇ
A “ a
˙
“ pµ1appq
"
d
dµ
pωpda{µqµq
*
µ“µappq
` ωpda{µappqqµappq,
where µappq “ limnÑ8 µpnqa ppq is defined in Lemma 4.
lim
nÑ8
d
dp
upnqa ppq
“µ1appq
"
d
dµ
prpda{µqµq
*
µ“µappq
´ pµ1appq
"
d
dµ
pωpda{µqµq
*
µ“µappq
` ωpda{µappqqµappq
“µ1appq
˜"
d
dµ
prpda{µqµq
*
µ“µappq
´ p
"
d
dµ
pωpda{µqµq
*
µ“µappq
¸
´ ωpda{µappqqµappq
“µ1appq
„
r
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
´ pω
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
´
ˆ
r1
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
´ pω1
ˆ
da
µappq
˙˙
da
µappq

´ ω
ˆ
da
µappq
˙
µappq
“u1appq,
where uap¨q is defined in (3.15). This recovers the desired result.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 13
By the chain rule, and the fact that qapµq “ ωpda{µq, we have that
d
dp
pqapµappqqµappqq “q1pµappqqµ1appqµappq ` qapµappqqµ1appq
“pωpda{µappqq ´ ω1pda{µappqqda{µappqqµ1appq (A.63)
Using the expression for µ1appq (cf. (3.20)), it is not difficult to show that, as a result of the
strong concavity of fap¨q in the interval px, xq, we have that infpPpc0,pq µ1appq ą 0. Further-
more, using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 5 and the fact that ωp¨q is
strongly concave with ωp0q ě 0, we have that infpPpc0,γqpωpda{µappqq´ω1pda{µappqqda{µappqq ą
0. Together, this implies that infpPpc0,γq
d
dp pqapµappqqµappqq ą 0, thus proving our claim.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 14
Note that
pµ1appq, 1qCpµ1appq, 1qᵀ “ ωpda{µappqq2daµ
1
appq
µappq2
`
pµ1appq ´ µappq
˘
. (A.64)
It therefore suffices to show that
pµ1appq ´ µappq ď 0. (A.65)
From Lemma 4, we have that
µ1appq “ ∆appq1´ p∆appqq1apµappqq{qapµappqq , (A.66)
where
∆appq “ qapµappqqf 1appqapµappqq, (A.67)
and
µappq “ fappqapµappqqq. (A.68)
Multiplying the left-hand side of (A.66) by p{µappq, we obtain
µ1appqp
µappq “
p∆appq{µappq
1´ p∆appqq1apµappqq{qapµappqq
“f
1
appqapµappqqq ppqapµappqqq
f ppqapµappqqq ¨
1
1´ p∆appqq1apµappqq{qapµappqq
ď f˜
1ppqapµappqqq ppqapµappqqq
f˜ ppqapµappqqq
¨ 1
1´ p∆appqq1apµappqq{qapµappqq
paqď 1
1´ p∆appqq1apµappqq{qapµappqq
pbqď1,
where paq follows from Proposition 5 combined with the non-negativity and concavity of
f˜p¨q, and pbq from the fact that q1apµq “ ´ωpda{µqda{µ2 ď 0. This proves (A.65) and hence
the proposition.
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